

RECENT NEPA CASE LAW (2025)

P.E. Danko, Esq.¹

Melanie Hernandez, Esq.

Fred Wagner, Esq.

This paper reviews decisions on substantive NEPA cases issued by federal courts in 2025 and explains the implications of the decisions and their relevance to NEPA practitioners.

INTRODUCTION

In 2025, the U.S. Courts of Appeals issued 32 substantive decisions involving implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by federal agencies. The 32 cases involved six different departments and one independent agency. Overall, the federal agencies prevailed in 22 of the cases, did not prevail in 3 cases, and prevailed on one NEPA claim but not the other NEPA claim(s) in 6 cases, with a total prevail rate of 71 percent (81 percent if the partial cases are included).² The U.S. Supreme Court issued one NEPA opinion in 2025; opinions from the U.S. District Courts were not reviewed.

For comparison purposes, Table 1 shows the number of U.S. Court of Appeals NEPA case decisions issued in 2006 – 2025, by circuit. For the first time, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued the highest number of decisions, 12, the Ninth Circuit issuing 11 decisions, with both greatly exceeding those in the other circuits, with both circuits accounting for 72% of the 2025 cases. The 32 decisions issued in 2025 is above the 2006 – 2024 annual average of 23 decisions per year. Figure 1 illustrates the states covered by each circuit court. The Supreme Court of the United States has heard 18 NEPA cases, and agencies have been successful in 100% of those decisions.


¹ Questions about this paper should be directed to: P.E. Danko, Esq., Environmental Attorney/Specialist, Hudson Danko Eng'r, LLC, pam@hudsondanko.com; Melanie Hernandez, Esq., Co-Founder, Environmental Attorney, Scout, 169 Saxony, Suite 214, Encinitas, CA 92024, melanie.hernandez@scoutenv.com; Fred Wagner, Esq., Principal Environmental Regulatory Advisor, Jacobs, fred.wagner@jacobs.com.

² One case is not counted for purposes of the statistics, but is reported, in the paper. *See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 153 F.4th 748 (9th Cir. 2025) (holding, in an interlocutory appeal, that BLM did not prevail in its consideration of a land exchange; the majority did not consider NEPA; Circuit Judge Bumatay, in his dissent, would have upheld the land exchange, and strongly opined BLM complied with NEPA, relying on the deference provided in *Seven County*).

Table 1. Number of U.S. Courts of Appeals NEPA Opinions, by year and circuit

	U.S. Courts of Appeals Circuits												
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	D.C.	TOTAL
2006					3		1	1	11	6		1	23
2007	1				1				8	2		3	15
2008	1	1	1					2	13	3	1	2	24
2009	1	3	1	2	1	1		1	13	2		2	27
2010		1				2	1	1	12	4	1	1	23
2011	1		1						12				14
2012	2	1	2	3	1		1		12	3	2	1	28
2013	2			2		1	1		9	2	1	3	21
2014				2		5			10	2		3	22
2015	1					1			6	2		4	14
2016				2		1	1		14	1	1	7	27
2017		1	1		1				13	1		8	25
2018			1	3	2	1			16		3	9	35
2019				1			1	1	9	2	1	6	21
2020		1			1	1			19		2		24
2021	1	1		2			1		6	2		5	18
2022				2		1	1		15	2	1	5	27
2023				1	2		2	1	12	3	1	3	25
2024	1				1		1		10	3		10	26
2025				1	1			1	11	2	3	12	32
TOTAL	11	9	7	21	14	14	11	8	231	42	17	85	471
Proportion of total	2%	2%	2%	5%	3%	3%	2%	2%	49%	9%	4%	18%	100

Figure 1. Map of U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal



STATISTICS

Federal agencies prevailed in 71 percent (81 percent if the partial opinions are included) of the substantive NEPA cases brought before the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was the defendant in the largest number of cases with 8 cases. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service [APHIS], U.S. Forest Service [USFS]) was a defendant in 7 cases. The Department of War (DOW)³ (United States Army Corps of Engineers, Department of the Navy), and the Department of the Interior (DOI) (Bureau of Land Management [BLM]) were involved in 5 cases. The Department of Transportation (DOT) (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [PHMSA]) was involved in 3 cases, each. The Surface Transportation Board was involved in two cases. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were involved in 1 case, each.

FERC prevailed in all of its 8 cases. The USDA prevailed in 3 of its 7 cases (in 2 cases the USDA did not prevail but partially prevailed in the remaining 2 cases). The DOW prevailed in all but 1 of its 5 cases.⁴ The DOI prevailed in 2 of its 5 cases (in 1 case the DOI did not prevail but partially prevailed in the remaining 2 cases). The DOT prevailed in its 3 cases. The Surface Transportation Board prevailed in both of its cases. Both DOE and DHS prevailed in each case, respectively.

Of the 32 substantive cases, 2 cases involved a categorical exclusion (CE), 15 cases involved environmental assessments (EA), 12 cases involved environmental impact statements (EIS), 1 case involved a Determination of NEPA Adequacy (DNA)⁵, and 2 cases involved no documents or involved federal action challenges, and 1 case (as reported in footnote 2) did not have a majority NEPA holding in its interlocutory appeal, but contained a strong dissent involving a substantive NEPA claim. For those cases involving: 2 CEs, the agency prevailed (100% success rate); EAs, the agency prevailed in 9 cases, did not prevail in 2 cases, and partially prevailed in 4 cases (73% agency success rate if partial cases counted, otherwise 60%); an EIS, the agencies prevailed in 12 cases, and partially prevailed in 2 cases (92% success rate if partial cases counted, otherwise 83%).

POST SEVEN COUNTY STATISTICS

³ Now, the Department of War.

⁴ See *Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force*, 128 F.4th 1089 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. granted sub nom. *Dep't of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan*, -- U.S.L.W. ---- (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026) (No. 25-579).

⁵ One case involved both an EA and a Determination of NEPA Adequacy (DNA), and in that case the agency prevailed on some claims but did not prevail in other claims.

Agencies were successful in all but 1 case (in one case the agency did not prevail, and in another partially prevailed) of the 13 cases⁶ (92% agency success rate (96% if partial cases are counted) that were published after the Supreme Court's decision in *Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado*, 605 U.S. 168, 145 S.Ct. 1497 (2025), in order of date of decision:

1. *Appalachian Voices v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 139 F.4th 903 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (Agency Prevailed)
2. *Coalition to Stop CPKC v. Surface Transp. Board*, No. 23-1165, 2025 WL 1720672 (D.C. Cir. Jun. 20, 2025) (Agency Prevailed)
3. *Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgm't*, 141 F.4th 976 (9th Cir. 2025) (Agency Partially Prevailed)
4. *American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby*, 144 F.4th 1178 (10th Cir. 2025) (Agency Prevailed)
5. *Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 145 F.4th 74 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (Agency Prevailed)
6. *Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 153 F.4th 748 (9th Cir. 2025) (holding that agency did not prevail in its consideration of a land exchange but not discussing NEPA in the interlocutory appeal; Circuit Judge Bumatay, dissenting, would have upheld the land exchange, and the strongly opined it complied with NEPA, citing to *Seven County*) *Not counted for statistical purposes.
7. *Cascadia Wildlands v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgm't*, 153 F. 4th 869 (9th Cir. 2025) (Agency Prevailed)
8. *Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 153 F.4th 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (Agency Prevailed)
9. *Badger Helicopters v. Fed. Aviation Admin.*, 154 F. 4th 902 (8th Cir. 2026) (Agency Prevailed)
10. *Gas Transmission Northwest, L.L.C. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 157 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (Agency Prevailed)
11. *Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 25-12873, 2025 WL 2598567 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025)

⁶ The statistics do not include the *Shoshone-Bannock* case because it did not contain a substantive NEPA ruling by the majority, however, the dissent does relies on *Seven County*, in its opinion that underlying NEPA analysis by the lower court was flawed.

12. *American Whitewater v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 2025 WL 2945591 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025)
(Agency Prevailed)

13. *Center for a Sustainable Coast v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, No. 24-14171 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) (Agency Prevailed)

Sector Statistics

This year, the paper has added sector statistics, and notes that many cases involve multiple industries.

Land Management – 10
Energy (Gas) – 10
Transportation (Rail) - 3
Energy (Oil) – 2
Energy (Oil and Natural Gas) – 2
Transportation (Aviation) – 2
Construction – 2
Energy (Hydroelectric) – 1
Defense - 1
Utility – 1
Security – 1

TRENDS

The following relates some trends and interesting conclusions from the substantive 2025 cases.

Alternatives Considered: Nine cases involved challenges to the sufficiency of the alternatives considered, and the courts upheld the agencies' selection of the preferred alternative in each case except for one.

- *Citizens Action Coal. of Indiana, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 125 F.4th 229 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (upholding FERC's rejection of petitioner's preferred expanded range of alternatives because they would not satisfy the purpose of transporting natural gas to the applicant, and rejecting petitioner's argument that non-gas alternatives be considered as part of the baseline no-action alternative)
- *American Whitewater v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 125 F.4th 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding that FERC reasonably concluded that removal of the dams was infeasible for a variety of practical and environmental reasons and did not need to be considered as part of the reasonable range of alternatives)
- *North Cascades Conserv. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 136 F.4th 816 (9th Cir. 2025) (concluding that the USFS sufficiently analyzed viable alternatives under NEPA, by analyzing in depth both a no-action alternative and a proposed action alternative and

including a discussion of eleven other alternatives rejected from detailed study, including NCCC's preferred "natural succession" alternative)

- *Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgm't*, 141 F.4th 976 (9th Cir. 2025) (upholding BLM's use of a "full field development" standard to guide its alternatives analysis, and finding that the agency had a rational basis for structuring its review around full development of the leases but finding that BLM failed to adequately explain why the final approved alternative deviated from that standard)
- *American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby*, 144 F.4th 1178 (10th Cir. 2025) (rejecting Plaintiffs' argument that BLM failed to adequately consider alternatives and concluding that BLM evaluated a reasonable range of alternatives, including different gather methods, levels of removal, and management strategies such as fertility control)
- *Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 153 F.4th 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (upholding FERC's definition of the no-action alternative and concluding that FERC reasonably presumed that TVA's natural gas turbine would be built regardless of whether the pipeline in question was ever approved)
- *Badger Helicopters v. Fed. Aviation Admin.*, 154 F. 4th 902 (8th Cir. 2026) (rejecting Petitioners' contention that the agencies did not include alternatives that would have adjusted the flight routes or altitudes from the current flight operations because they considered and rejected including other alternatives like those preferred by Petitioners)
- *Gas Transmission Northwest, L.L.C. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 157 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (upholding the agency's admittedly brief analysis of the no-action alternative because FERC provided a resource-by-resource analysis of the existing state of each resource (i.e., the baseline) and how the project would impact that *status quo* citing to *Seven County*)
- *American Whitewater v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, No. 24-6402, 2025 WL 2945591 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025) (holding that the USFS analyzed a reasonable range of alternatives in the Project's EA and agreeing with the USFS' choice to prioritize safety in framing the Project's purpose and need even if it ultimately narrowed the range of alternatives that the agency considered)

Connected Actions (Segmentation): Four cases involved allegations that the agency segmented the action, by not including connected actions.

- *Okeelanta Corporation v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 132 F.4th 1320 (11th Cir. 2025) (holding that the Corps reasonably defined the scope of its NEPA analysis by focusing on the effects of the permitted project rather than broader regional activities, and emphasizing that NEPA requires agencies to evaluate impacts that are proximately caused by the federal action, not speculative or attenuated effects that depend on independent decisions by third parties)

- *Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 145 F.4th 74 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (refusing to order FERC to consider the impacts of a potentially related state facility as part of its NEPA review, because FERC was not the authorizing agency for that state facility, that action was not “federalized” for purposes of NEPA review)
- *Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 153 F.4th 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (rejecting Sierra Club’s allegations that FERC failed to consider impacts of the natural gas turbine as a “connected action” because FERC lacked jurisdiction over the development of the turbine, using the reasoning set out by *Seven County*)
- *Gas Transmission Northwest, L.L.C. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 157 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (finding that FERC drew a reasonable line when it declined to assess the impacts of replacement compressors as potential “connected actions” because the replacements were not two phases of a single action, but “separate, independent projects” which was a reasonable “manageable line” for FERC to draw)

Remedies: Three cases involved appeals that considered the appropriate remedy, and in all three cases, the courts did not vacate the underlying actions.

- *Montana Wildlife Federation v. Haaland*, 127 F.4th 1 (9th Cir. 2025) (applying the *Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n*, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the disruptive consequences of vacating the leases outweighed the seriousness of the agency’s procedural errors because the violations in Idaho were more limited in scope and could be remedied without undoing the lease sales)
- *Marin Audubon Society v. Federal Aviation Admin.*, 129 F.4th 869 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (agreeing with the majority, the concurring opinion stated succinctly that vacatur without any stay of the mandate would have the effect of putting the prevailing parties in a worse position vis-à-vis the protections at issue than if they had not brought their challenge)
- *City of Port Isabel v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 130 F.4th 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (remanding the orders to FERC without vacatur because the court weighed the traditional *Allied-Signal* factors, finding the errors identified in this matter were not so “fundamental” because of the extensive record of NEPA analyses for the underlying projects, and concluding that those errors did not justify throwing the projects and the planning supporting those projects into disarray)

Assessment of Impacts: Twenty-two of the cases examined one or more challenges to assessment of impacts. The courts tended to focus on the deference afforded to the agency when they upheld the impact assessment, especially in those post-*Seven County* decisions.

Categorical Exclusion (CE): Only one case scrutinized the application of CEs to projects; the other categorical exclusion case involved a remedy determination only. See *Marin Audubon*, *infra*.

- *Center for a Sustainable Coast v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, No. 24-14171 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) (rejecting Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps could not apply the categorical exclusion to projects of this size, explaining that the governing regulation allows such streamlined review where the agency determines the project is minor, and has no significant environmental impacts)

Reasonably Foreseeable Impacts: Twenty cases considered challenges to assessment of impacts, including direct, indirect, and other reasonably foreseeable impacts, and for cases adjudicated prior to the rescission of the CEQ implementing regulations, cumulative impacts.

- *Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado*, 605 U.S. 168, 145 S.Ct. 1497 (2025) (defining a reasonable range of effects to consider those close in time and place to the project action, including certain closely interrelated indirect effects. In sum, an agency is permitted to draw “manageable lines” regarding the appropriate scope of NEPA review that will perform the statute’s intended function – to inform the public and the agency’s decision-maker)
- *Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n*, 125 F.4th 229 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (rejecting arguments concerning the adequacy of FERC’s greenhouse gas emission analysis and use of various social cost of carbon measures, and holding that FERC was not required to label potential emissions as “significant” or “non-significant” because it found that FERC thoroughly analyzed project emissions in the EIS and therefore did not have to place a label on the nature of those impacts)
- *Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.*, 125 F.4th 1170 (D. C. Cir. 2025) (agreeing with Sierra Club that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious because it PHMSA failed to take a hard look at how the LNG Rule would affect public safety)
- *South Carolina Coastal Conserv. League v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Charleston Div.*, 127 F.4th 457 (4th Cir. 2025) (rejecting Plaintiffs' argument that the agencies were required to conduct site-specific surveys rather than assume species presence because NEPA does not require agencies to gather additional data where the available information is sufficient to support a reasoned analysis)
- *Healthy Gulf v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n*, 132 F.4th 544 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding that FERC properly concluded that it could not reasonably predict certain upstream greenhouse gas impacts because it did not know “whether transported gas would come from new or existing production”)
- *Indigenous Peoples of the Coastal Bend v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 132 F.4th 872 (5th Cir. 2025) (disagreeing with contention that the Corps did not conduct a

sufficient cumulative impacts analysis under NEPA, and explaining that NEPA does not require agencies to engage in exhaustive or speculative analysis)

- *Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy*, 134 F.4th 568 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding that DOE reasonably determined that the environmental impacts of downstream emissions in foreign countries were too speculative to require detailed analysis under NEPA; and, rejecting Plaintiffs’ argument that DOE was required to quantify downstream emissions impacts)
- *WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv. Wildlife Servs.*, 135 F.4th 717 (9th Cir. 2025) (holding the agency’s EA did not provide adequate explanations to demonstrate the agency took a hard look at the scientific uncertainty presented to it and emphasizing that a core NEPA obligation is to meaningfully engage with contrary scientific viewpoints, regardless of agency opposition or study location).
- *North Cascades Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 136 F.4th 816 (9th Cir. 2025) (agreeing with Plaintiff’s contention that the EA is insufficient under NEPA because it does not discuss the cumulative effects of the original Twisp Restoration Project in combination with the Midnight Restoration Project (which was added after a fire in the interim but before the Final EA) since that project was “reasonably foreseeable”)
- *WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 137 F.4th 1068 (10th Cir. 2025) (holding that the USFS did not address the cumulative impacts of the Wishbone Allotments on neighboring herds despite acknowledging the existence of those herds in the EA)
- *Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgm’t*, 141 F.4th 976 (9th Cir. 2025) (finding that BLM complied with NEPA in its analysis of downstream greenhouse gas emissions by estimating emissions from reasonably foreseeable future development within the cumulative effects section of the SEIS, and in doing so, BLM adequately considered both indirect and cumulative impacts)
- *American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby*, 144 F.4th 1178 (10th Cir. 2025) (disagreeing with Petitioners’ claim that BLM ignored the environmental impacts of the potential of increased grazing, and ruling that that “when the effects of an agency action arise from a separate project—for example, a possible future project or one that is geographically distinct from the project at hand—NEPA does not require the agency to evaluate the effects of that separate project.”)
- *Cascadia Wildlands v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgm’t*, 153 F.4th 869 (9th Cir. 2025) (holding that BLM took the requisite “hard look” at environmental impacts under NEPA. The court found that the agency adequately analyzed the project’s effects on marbled murrelet habitat, including potential edge effects and habitat modification)

- *Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 145 F.4th 74 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (rejecting claims that FERC should have considered a broad scope of indirect upstream effects of the proposed pipeline, as running “headlong” into the Supreme Court’s “course correction” in *Seven County*)
- *Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 153 F.4th 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (upholding agency’s downstream greenhouse gas emission analysis because the agency properly considered the reduction of emissions related to the planned retirement of the coal-fired plant in addition to potential emissions from the new natural gas turbine)
- *Badger Helicopters v. Fed. Aviation Admin.*, 154 F. 4th 902 (8th Cir. 2026) (agreeing with the agencies' choice of flight data chosen for impact assessment because the it relied on reliable data, which was in the agencies' view, “the most accurate and current data available during the period that th[ese Plans were] being drafted”)
- *Gas Transmission Northwest, L.L.C. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n*, 157 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (rejecting claims that FERC did not adequately consider safety risks of the proposed expansion project when it discussed incremental safety risks and mitigation resulting from the Department of Transportation’s safety standards, as well as the proposed compressor station’s remote location, and finding under *Seven County*, this was sufficient)
- *Central Oregon Wild Horse Coalition v. Vilsack*, No. 23-4260, 2025 WL 25696 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025) (rejecting the Coalition’s contentions that the USFS did not consider each of the CEQ’s ten “intensity” factors for assessing significance as part of its FONSI)
- *Western Watersheds Project v. Washington*, No. 23-3872, 2025 WL 457098 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025) (holding that because the USFS considered the relevant factors and “provided a convincing statement of reasons” explaining why the Stateline Project's effects were expected to be insignificant, it did not violate NEPA when it decided not to issue an EIS)
- *Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, No. 23-2882, No. 23-2886, No. 23-3146, 2025 WL 586358 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025) (agreeing with CBD that because USFS’ analysis of baseline conditions was premised on unsupported assumptions that unauthorized roads use is sporadic and temporary, and that ineffective barriers and road closures would be promptly repaired, the USFS’ “failure to explain [these] baseline assumption[s] frustrated [its] ability to take a ‘hard look’” at the effects of unauthorized road use)
- *Coalition to Stop CPKC v. Surface Transp. Board*, No. 23-1165, 2025 WL 1720672 (D.C. Cir. Jun. 20, 2025) (rejecting five disputes regarding the assumptions underlying the STB’s impact analysis relating to train speeds, average train length (by overweighting passenger trains compared to freight trains), freight train length, the

flow of train and vehicular traffic, and the lack of pertinent field studies, and ruling that the STB reasonably considered the risk of increased pedestrian/train strikes caused by potentially higher train traffic)

Each of the substantive 2025 NEPA cases, organized by federal agency, is summarized below. Unpublished cases are noted (7 of the 32 substantive cases in 2025 were unpublished). Although such cases may not have precedential value depending on the court, they can be of value to NEPA practitioners.

**2025 NEPA CASE
U.S. SUPREME COURT**

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, 605 U.S. 168, 145 S.Ct. 1497 (2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Scope of impact assessment; standard of judicial review; role of NEPA in agency decision-making process

Sector: Transportation (Rail)

Facts: In 2020, the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition (Seven County) applied to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) for approval of an 88-mile railroad line connecting Utah's oil-rich Uinta Basin to the national freight rail network, facilitating the transportation of crude oil to refineries along the Gulf Coast. STB prepared a full EIS and technical reports totaling over 3600 pages. Analysis included assessment of upstream and downstream environmental impacts and a range of feasible alternatives. EIS review potential effects of development of "waxy crude oil," which would be transported on the new rail line, safety issues resulting from the potential increase in rail traffic beyond the Uinta Basin in Utah, and potential GHG emissions.

Petitions challenging the adequacy of the STB's EIS action were filed in the D. C. Circuit by a Colorado county and several environmental organizations. The D. C. Circuit found numerous NEPA violations, holding primarily that the STB impermissibly limited its analysis of the environmental effects from upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining projects. For instance, the STB did not assess the potential air quality and environmental justice effects of refining the waxy crude oil in facilities as far away as Louisiana. The D.C. Circuit concluded that those effects were "reasonably foreseeable" and that the EIS should have analyzed a broader range of upstream and downstream impacts. Based on the deficiencies it found in the EIS. The court vacated both the EIS and the Board's final approval of the new rail line. Seven County filed a cert petition.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the D.C. Circuit and vacated the ruling for further consideration consistent with the ruling.

Decision: The Supreme Court held that the D. C. Circuit failed to afford the STB the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the STB to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the proposed rail line.

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, held that it was time for a "course correction" to bring APA judicial review under NEPA "back in line with the statutory text and common sense." The Court stressed repeatedly that lower courts should defer to the informed discretion and reasonable choices made by an agency concerning the scope and contents of an EIS. In so ruling, the Court also held that review of an agency's EIS is NOT the same as review of the agency's action concerning the project itself. The Court reiterated prior rulings that NEPA is a "procedural statute, acting as a "cross-check, not a substantive roadblock. The goal of the law is to inform agency decision-making, not to paralyze it." In a now oft-quoted conclusion, the Court stated that "[t]he bedrock principle of judicial review in NEPA cases can be stated in a word: Deference."

In addition to reinforcing the appropriate standard of review, the Court defined the reasonable scope of analysis. If an action may lead to construction of or increased use of a separate project, an agency need not consider the effects of that separate project. The Court found that the STB had no regulatory authority over separate projects, such as new resource development or the building/operation of refineries in Louisiana. "NEPA calls for the agency

to focus on the environmental effects of the project itself, not on the potential environmental effects of future or geographically separate projects.”

The Court generally defined a reasonable range of effects to consider those close in time and place to the project action, including certain closely interrelated indirect effects. In sum, an agency is permitted to draw “manageable lines” regarding the appropriate scope of NEPA review that will perform the statute’s intended function – to inform the public and the agency’s decision-maker.

In conclusion, the Court held: “Plaintiffs’ policy objections to this 88-mile Utah railroad may or may not be persuasive. But neither “the language nor the history of NEPA suggests that it was intended to give citizens a general opportunity to air their policy objections to proposed federal actions.”

2025 NEPA CASES U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv. Wildlife Servs., 135 F.4th 717 (9th Cir. 2025)

Agency did not prevail.

Issues: Proposed Action, Impact Assessment

Sector: Land Management

Facts: Environmental conservation organizations (collectively, WildEarth) brought action against the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services (APHIS-WS) challenging its issuance of an EA and FONSI under NEPA, which authorized predator damage and conflict management program in Wilderness Area and wilderness study areas (BLM lands) in Nevada.

As a matter of background, the USDA’s APHIS-WS provides predator damage management (PDM) services in Nevada to protect privately owned livestock from predators and, less often, to protect public safety. The agency makes recommendations for reducing depredation of livestock and provides operational assistance. It conducts PDM at the request of both public and private property owners. In conducting its PDM operations, Wildlife Services uses a variety of lethal and non-lethal methods.

The current case is another challenge with a history that began in 2012, when WildEarth filed a lawsuit

alleging that continued reliance on a 1994 programmatic EIS for PDM in Nevada violated NEPA. The parties settled that suit in 2016. As part of the settlement, APHIS-WS agreed to cease all PDM activities in Nevada Wilderness and Wilderness Study Areas until it completed a new NEPA analysis for the Nevada PDM Program (but could continue PDM in the rest of Nevada).

In 2019, APHIS-WS released a draft EA that examined impacts of its PDM program in Nevada and the anticipated impacts of returning PDM to Wilderness and Wilderness Study Areas. In July 2020, APHIS-WS released a final EA.

Decision: First, WildEarth claimed that APHIS-WS failed to examine PDM services in the relevant geographic context to adequately evaluate the environmental impacts of the agency’s proposed action, specifically at the local scale.

The Ninth Circuit discussed that the EA’s description of the federal lands where the proposed PDM actions will occur was internally inconsistent. Serious ambiguity concerning the inclusion or exclusion of just one of the federal land designations at issue—Areas of Critical Environmental Concern—changes the geographic scope of the PDM program by over 1.4 million acres. The court opined that a clear disclosure of geographic areas where PDM may be conducted is essential to ensuring that the public is both informed and able to participate meaningfully in the NEPA process. “By leaving the public guessing where APHIS-WS proposes to conduct PDM, the agency vitiated NEPA’s purpose because it deprived the public of the ability to evaluate the impacts of the agency’s proposed actions.” The court also found that APHIS-

WED did not adequately explain its decision not to analyze local impacts in addition to its statewide assessment.”

WildEarth argued that APHIS-WS should have prepared an EIS rather than an EA due to the significance of the proposed impacts. WildEarth claimed that the EA’s was inadequate in its assessment of impacts for three intensity factors: (1) public health and safety risks from lead shot and cyanide use; (2) impacts on unique and sensitive areas, specifically Wilderness Areas and Wilderness Study Areas; and (3) scientific studies that raised substantial uncertainty about the effectiveness of lethal predator control.

The Ninth Circuit sustained WildEarth’s claims. On the topic of public health and safety, the court observed that the EA failed to address whether the 600 pounds of lead ammunition anticipated to be used for PDM would result in a concentrated introduction of lead into the environment. Likewise, the court rejected APHIS-WS response to concerns about M-44 cyanide ejector devices. With respect to impacts to unique areas, the court opined that any impacts to nearby unique areas weigh in favor of ordering an EIS, regardless of the severity of the impact.

Finally, the court examined that APHIS-WS selected some older studies to support its position on lethal PDM and cited internal government audits that demonstrate it follows its own policies, but it did not engage with the contrary, more recent studies. The court emphasized that a core NEPA obligation is to meaningfully engage with contrary scientific viewpoints, regardless of agency opposition or study location.

In sum, based NEPA violations, the Ninth Circuit vacated the EA and FONSI and remanded to the district court to enter an order directing the agency to determine whether to prepare a new EA or an EIS.

North Cascades Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 136 F.4th 816 (9th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed on all NEPA claims but one

Issues: Public Participation, Alternatives, Impact Assessment, Cumulative Impacts

Sector: Land Management

Facts: Environmental conservation group (NCCC) brought action alleging USFS approved a restoration project, the Twisp Restoration Project (TRP), covering 24,140 acres of forest land within the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest, without fully complying with NEPA.

The TRP area lies in a portion of the Forest managed by the USFS under a 1989 land and resources management plan. The TRP is a restoration strategy to make the forest more resilient in the face of wildfire, insect outbreaks and habitat decline. The project proposes treatments including logging and thinning, protecting riparian habitat, creating and preserving wildlife habitat, and treating areas of the forest closest to residential areas to reduce fire intensity and increase access for firefighters.

Development of the TRP began in June 2019, in a 79,682-acre area of the Methow Valley Ranger District covered by the Twisp Evaluation. In November 2019, a scoping letter was sent to 362 individuals, groups, and agencies describing the proposed project, scheduling a public open house, and inviting comments on the proposal. After receiving responses, including a response from NCCC, the USFS issued a Draft EA in October 2020.

In August 2021, between the close of the Draft EA comment period and the release of the Final EA, the Cedar Creek Fire burned through areas of the Forest originally included in the TRP area. In response, the USFS revised the proposed project to omit areas potentially affected by the fire, created a Midnight Restoration Project for the fire-damaged area, and explained those revisions in a virtual public meeting in January 2022. The USFS released the Final EA in April 2022 without a comment period, and the DN/FONSI in July 2022.

Decision: The opinion began with the statement, “all judges supporting the continuation of life on our planet need to be sensitive to environmental considerations . . . The case before us involves competing interests of logging and environmental interest groups. [The court] point[s] out that there is a practical distinction between, on the one hand, logging for the sake only of harvesting timber, and, on the other hand, thinning trees in a forest for the purpose of promoting a healthier and more resilient forest, better able to suppress or to weather the tidal wave of wildfires afflicting the country.”

NCCC claimed that the USFS was required under NEPA to reopen the comment period following the changes made to the TRP in response to the Cedar Creek Fire. The court disagreed, stating that changes made in response to the Cedar Creek Fire—namely the reduction in size of the TRP by 69%, and the ensuing changes to temporary haul roads and haul routes necessitated by the reduced size—are not substantial changes triggering a requirement to repeat the public comment process under NEPA.

Next, NCC argued the USFS relied upon an overly narrow statement of “purpose and need” in the EA and did not consider a reasonable range of alternatives. However, the court rejected NCC’s contention that the USFS failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives. The court concluded that USFS sufficiently analyzed viable alternatives under NEPA, by analyzing in depth both a no-action alternative and a proposed action alternative and including a discussion of eleven other alternatives rejected from detailed study, including NCCC’s preferred “natural succession” alternative. Because NCCC did not provide sufficient detail to determine what a natural succession alternative would involve, the court concluded that the USFS that the was not obligated under NEPA to consider it.

NCCC argued that the USFS inadequately addressed direct, indirect, and cumulative effects by (1) relying on condition-based management and maximum effects analysis and (2) failing to address the related Midnight Restoration Project. The court disagreed with both contentions, reasoning that the TRP is small and has been extensively mapped, concluding that there were sufficient details to satisfy NEPA (but noted it was a close call).

NCCC argued the cumulative impacts analysis of the TRP in combination with the Midnight Restoration Project was insufficient. Here, the court agreed with NCCC that the USFS is required to analyze the Midnight project and any cumulative impacts, since that project was “reasonably foreseeable.”

The court remanded the case to determine what the USFS needs to do to remedy the deficiency in its environmental analysis and whether, “in light of its revised cumulative effects analysis, an in-depth environmental impact statement (EIS) is necessary.”

WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.4th 1068 (10th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed on one NEPA claim but did not prevail on other NEPA claims

Issues: Impact Assessment, Cumulative Impacts

Sector: Land Management

Facts: Conservation groups (WildEarth) brought action under NEPA against the USFS, challenging the agency's decision to open new domestic sheep grazing allotments (the Wishbone Allotments) in the Rio Grande National Forest in Colorado that also had herds of Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep.

The USFS' decision to open the Wishbone Allotments in the Rio Grande National Forest in 2017 followed two previous decisions in 2013 and 2015 to vacate larger grazing allotments which the USFS determined posed an unacceptable risk to bighorn sheep populations. Those decisions relied on the “risk of contact model (RCM), a modeling tool the USFS uses to determine the likelihood a grazing allotment will risk domestic sheep coming into contact with bighorn sheep. In contrast to previous decisions, the USFS' 2017 decision authorizing the Wishbone Allotments eschewed the results of the risk of contact model—which again predicted a high risk of contact—and asserted that outside factors such as the geography of the allotments, the length of the bighorn sheep grazing season, and the use of best management practices by herders would mitigate the risk.

Contact between domestic sheep and bighorns is dangerous because of deadly pathogens, specifically, *Mannheimia haemolytica*, that domestic sheep carry and transmit to bighorn sheep. Once a wild sheep is infected through contact with a domestic sheep, they carry that pathogen back to their herd and even to other herds, which can lead to catastrophic results. The USFS has explained that in the Rio Grande National Forest, “four bighorn sheep herds are still experiencing lingering effects . . . of past disease events dating back to the mid 1990's.”

In November 2017, the USFS released the FEA for the Wishbone Allotments, reiterating its conclusion that local factors merited downgrading the RCM's risk from high to moderate, and the USFS released a DN/FONSI in March 2018.

Decision: WildEarth argued the USFS failed to take a hard look at the environmental impacts to bighorn

sheep herds in creating the Wishbone Allotments by (1) arbitrarily downgrading the RCM result from high to moderate using “local factors,” (2) overstating the effectiveness of project design criteria, (3) failing to consider the cumulative environmental impacts to neighboring bighorn herds, and (4) by not using the best available science.

The Tenth Circuit rejected the USFS’ logic that the RCM should be used in conjunction with on-the-ground specifics. In doing so, the court criticized the USFS, stating that the USFS did not identify any scientific support that the model’s results can be changed using local factors.

The court then considered there was no scientific support for the idea that project design criteria can successfully separate bighorn sheep from domestic sheep where the RCM predicts a high risk of contact. The court held that in the absence of any science or data suggesting that project design criteria could become effective in combination with other features such as spatial or temporal separation, the USFS’s reliance on untethered “logic” alone was insufficient to satisfy NEPA’s “hard look requirement.”

WildEarth argued the USFS violated NEPA in creating the Wishbone Allotments for the additional reason that it failed to take a hard look at threats to bighorn sheep besides the three herds closest to the Wishbone Allotments. The Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that the USFS did not address the cumulative impacts of the Wishbone Allotments on neighboring herds despite acknowledging the existence of those herds in the EA as well as the high risk to their survival generated by a disease interval of thirty-two-years or less.

However, the Tenth Circuit rejected WildEarth’s contention that by using only Colorado’s Parks and Wildlife’s preliminary telemetry data and not requesting additional data before releasing a final decision, the USFS missed most of the relevant data before rendering its decision creating the Wishbone Allotments. The court reasoned that because of the deference given to agencies in determining which methodologies and science to rely on, and because the USFS did use the data available to it, the USFS was not required under NEPA to wait for the full study.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy.

Central Oregon Wild Horse Coalition v. Vilsack, No. 23-4260, 2025 WL 25696 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Impact Assessment

Sector: Land Management

Facts: A non-profit organization and certain of its members and individuals (collectively, the Coalition) challenged the USFS’ decision to approve the Ochocho Herd Management Plan, alleging various NEPA violations in its EA.

Decision: The Coalition argued that the USFS violated NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at the available data regarding the herd’s genetics. The court examined that the UFS relied on two genetic studies of the herd—among other evidence—and the Coalition simply quibbles with the methodology and results from those studies. It found the USFS provided a reasonably thorough discussion of the risks associated with the herd’s genetics and probable consequences. *League of Wilderness Defs. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Allen*, 615 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Ninth Circuit rejected the Coalition’s contentions that the USFS did not consider each of the CEQ’s ten “intensity” factors for assessing significance as part of its FONSI and that an EIS, rather than an EA, should have been reviewed. First, the court did not agree with the Coalition that the project was “highly controversial.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (2019). It found the USFS “considered and addressed the existing literature in its [EA] and provided reasoning for its conclusions,” stating, that “[m]ere opposition to an action does not create a controversy within the meaning of NEPA regulations.”

The court then found that the USFS reasonably concluded that the “possible effects” of the Plan were not “highly uncertain” and do not “involve unique or unknown risks.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (5) (2019). The risks to the herd’s unique genetics were not “highly” uncertain, as the USFS’ genetic plan was consistent with recommendations in the National Research Council’s report and BLM’s Handbook, genetic studies of the herd, and advice from multiple experts, and was consistent with its prior introduction of new mares to the herd.

The court finally found that the USFS' decision was not precedential, *see* 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(6) (2019), because the Plan is "highly specific to the project and the locale," *Barnes v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.*, 655 F.3d 1124, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011), and the Plan does not have a binding effect on future actions, *Anderson v. Evans*, 371 F.3d 475, 493 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court's summary judgment in favor of the agency.

Western Watersheds Project v. Washington, No. 23-3872, 2025 WL 457098 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Impact Assessment, Cumulative Impacts

Sector: Land Management

Facts: Environmental organizations (collectively, Western Watersheds) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the USFS, finding the USFS' EA and FONSI took a hard look at the environmental impacts of the Stateline Project, which reauthorized livestock grazing on allotments in the Apache-Sitgreaves and Gila National Forests.

Decision: Western Watersheds argued that the USFS did not take a hard look at the effects of the proposed livestock grazing on the Mexican gray wolf, particularly regarding livestock-related wolf removals and prey displacement. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that the record showed that the USFS considered these issues (as well as other factors relevant to the project's effect on the Mexican gray wolf) and reasonably concluded that the proposed grazing was not likely to adversely affect the subspecies.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected Western Watershed's argument that the USFS failed to take a hard look at the cumulative effects of past and future removals (both within and outside of the project area) on the genetic diversity of the Mexican gray wolf population, because there is no evidence the Stateline Project is likely to cause removals. It discussed that Western Watershed have not shown that a loss of genetic diversity due to removals is a potential cumulative impact of the project. *See Ctr. for Env't L. & Pol'y v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation*, 655 F.3d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the party challenging an

EA's cumulative impacts analysis has the initial burden to show 'the potential for cumulative impact).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the agency.

Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 23-2882, No. 23-2886, No. 23-3146, 2025 WL 586358 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025)

Agency Prevailed on some NEPA claims but did not prevail on remaining NEPA claim.

Issue: Impact Assessment

Facts: This appeal, which involved consolidated cases, concerns the Black Ram Project in the Kootenai National Forest and its effects on the grizzly bear. The Center for Biological Diversity, Yaak Valley Forest Council, and WildEarth Guardians (collectively, CBD) along with consolidated plaintiffs Alliance for the Wild Rockies and Native Ecosystems Council (collectively, AWR), brought claims against the USFS alleging various violations of NEPA for its EA/FONSI.

Decision: The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower's court's opinion that the USFS made a mistake in relying on stale grizzly bear population data to establish the environmental baseline for its FEA. The Ninth Circuit noted that the updated population data showed a potential improvement for grizzly bears. The data the agency relied on estimated the population between 55 to 60 bears in 2017, whereas the 2021 estimate was 60 to 65 bears. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the newer data would not have altered the USFS' analysis or decision, and CBD failed to articulate any way in which public participation could have been materially affected.

When it came to unauthorized road use within the project area, the topic that dominated the oral argument earlier this month, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court that unauthorized road use must be included in road density calculations and that the Forest Service did not provide clear data on that.

The Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to AWR on its claim. Under NEPA, an agency's "assessment of baseline conditions 'must be based on accurate information and defensible reasoning.'" *Great Basin Res. Watch v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 844 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). It found the USFS' analysis of

baseline conditions was premised on unsupported assumptions that unauthorized roads use is sporadic and temporary, and that ineffective barriers and road closures would be promptly repaired. The USFS' "failure to explain [these] baseline assumption[s] frustrated [its] ability to take a 'hard look'" at the effects of unauthorized road use. *Great Basin Res. Watch.*, 844 F.3d at 1104.

"Given the uncertainty as to the extent of ineffective closures and chronic unauthorized road use, it is impossible to discern actual, baseline motorized access conditions." As such, the agency can't determine whether the project complies with the access standards in the Kootenai National Forest Plan. The Ninth Circuit held that the USFS had violated the NEPA by not taking a "hard look" at unauthorized road use.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

American Whitewater v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 24-6402, 2025 WL 2945591 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Alternatives, Impact Assessment.

Sector: Land Management

Facts: Non-governmental organizations (American Whitewater) argued that the USFS violated NEPA when it approved projects to cut down trees burned by wildfires on National Forest land in 2020 and 2021 based on the EAs (collectively, the EA).

Decision: The Ninth Circuit held that the USFS analyzed a reasonable range of alternatives in the challenged Project's EA. American Whitewater admitted the purpose and need statement itself was not unreasonably narrow.

The court agreed that the USFS' choice to prioritize safety in framing the Project's purpose and need was reasonable, even if it ultimately narrowed the range of alternatives that the agency considered. *See, e.g., City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.*, 123 F.3d 1142, 1155-57 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that even though the USFS only considered two alternatives in detail— action and no action— the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly upheld similar NEPA reviews as long as the agency did not fail to consider

a reasonable alternative. *Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 87 F.4th 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2023). Here, the USFS adequately explained why other alternatives were unreasonable because they were inconsistent with the Project's purpose and need.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that the USFS improperly tiered to the agency's "Hazard Tree Guidelines." These guidelines were "not substantive," and the agency properly incorporated them by reference under 40 C.F.R. § 1501.12 (2022). The court agreed with the USFS' approach in citing these guidelines, providing an independent description of their content, and linking to a public webpage containing the guidelines in their entirety.

The Ninth Circuit held that the USFS took a hard look at the Project's likely impacts, including impacts on wildlife, including the northern spotted owl. The USFS' extensive discussion in both the EA itself and the incorporated wildlife analyses demonstrates that the USFS provided a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of [the Project's] probable environmental consequences" on wildlife.

The USFS also took a "hard look" at the Project's cumulative effects. "[T]he determination of the extent and effect of [cumulative impact] factors ... is a task assigned to the special competency of the appropriate agencies." *Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood*, 161 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (second alteration in original). The Ninth Circuit discussed that American Whitewater has not demonstrated that the USFS' determination that the Project would lead to only minor or negligible cumulative effects was unreasonable.

Finally, the court upheld USFS's reliance on a specialist report and its underlying data, to support its impact analysis involving impacts to rivers protected by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, even if it did fail to provide adequate reference to that report within the EA during public availability periods.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR

South Carolina Coastal Conserv. League v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Charleston Div., 127 F.4th 457 (4th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Impact Assessment

Sector: Construction

Facts: Environmental organizations challenged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a Clean Water Act § 404 permit for a large mixed-use development known as the Cainhoy Project in coastal South Carolina. The project would convert approximately 3,906 acres of forested land, including wetlands, into residential and commercial development, while placing the remaining acreage under conservation protections.

As part of its environmental review, the Corps prepared an EA and issued a FONSI. The Corps also consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act regarding impacts to listed species, including the northern long-eared bat (NLEB) and the red-cockaded woodpecker.

During the course of the review, the regulatory status of the NLEB changed from threatened to endangered, triggering reinitiation of consultation. Notably, the species had never been observed on the project site and was last documented approximately 8.5 miles away. Rather than conducting site-specific surveys, the project proponents elected to assume the presence of the species, and the USFWS accepted that approach, explaining that available surveys could confirm only presence or absence and could not reliably estimate population density or the number of individuals potentially affected.

Because the Service determined that it was not practical to quantify take in terms of individual bats due to their small size, dispersed habitat, nocturnal behavior, and the likelihood that most impacts would be non-lethal and undetectable, it used a habitat-based surrogate to measure anticipated take. Specifically, the Service defined take in terms of the 3,906 acres of roosting and foraging habitat affected by the project, with reinitiation of consultation triggered if that acreage or associated conditions were exceeded.

The Biological Opinion concluded that, although habitat loss could result in injury or mortality, the impacts would be limited because bats were expected to relocate to the surrounding forested landscape, which included millions of acres of

available habitat. The Corps incorporated these findings and mitigation measures into its permit and ultimately concluded that the project would not result in significant environmental impacts requiring preparation of an EIS.

Plaintiffs challenged the Corps' decision under NEPA to rely on an EA rather than preparing an EIS. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and Plaintiffs appealed.

Decision: The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Corps' approval, concluding that the agency complied with both NEPA and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the agencies were required to conduct site-specific surveys rather than assume species presence. The court held that the decision to assume presence was reasonable under the circumstances and consistent with a precautionary approach. It further explained that NEPA (and the ESA) do not require agencies to gather additional data where the available information is sufficient to support a reasoned analysis. Because the agencies disclosed the uncertainty and explained their methodology, the lack of site-specific survey data did not render the analysis arbitrary or capricious.

Third, the court held that the Corps satisfied NEPA's "hard look" requirement. The court emphasized that NEPA is a procedural statute that requires agencies to consider environmental consequences, not to eliminate all uncertainty or reach particular results. The Corps reasonably relied on the Biological Opinion and incorporated its findings into the EA. The court declined to second-guess the agency's technical judgments where the record demonstrated that the Corps considered the relevant factors, including species impacts and habitat loss, and provided a rational explanation for its conclusions.

Finally, the court upheld the Corps' decision to prepare an EA rather than an EIS. The court concluded that the agency reasonably determined that the project would not result in significant environmental impacts, particularly in light of the surrounding available habitat and the mitigation measures imposed. Accordingly, the Corps' issuance of a FONSI was supported by the record.

Indigenous Peoples of the Coastal Bend v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 132 F.4th 872 (5thCir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Impact Assessment

Sector: Energy (Oil)

Facts: This involved an administrative challenge to a construction permit issued by USACE to expand operations at an oil export terminal on Texas's Gulf Coast. The Moda Ingleside Crude Export Terminal, located in Ingleside, Texas, is currently the largest export terminal by volume in North America, moving roughly 11.6 million barrels per day at the Port of Corpus Christi, the leading U.S. port for oil exports. Seeking to expand the Terminal further, the owner (Enbridge Oil Terminal, LLC) applied for a permit to dredge the seafloor and discharge the dredged material into U.S. waters. The terminal expansion included constructing five new barge docks, adding a 1,700-foot-diameter turning basin, and building a deep-water ship dock.

In 2020, USACE prepared a 54-page EA and approved the permit. The scope of EA analysis included potential impacts from the structural improvements to the East Basin; the 491-foot bulkhead extension area along the shoreline; the structural improvements and 43-acre dredging footprint in the West Basin; the Sunset Lake seagrass mitigation area, and 50-acre wooded habitat mitigation area along the eastern side of the facility to be preserved.

Two Native American tribes and a Coastal Bend environmental association sued to invalidate the permit, claiming the project would significantly damage seagrasses and wetlands and that USACE violated NEPA, the Clean Water Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied summary judgment for Plaintiffs and granted summary judgment for USACE, concluding the Corps adequately studied the environmental impacts of the proposed expansion..

Decision: The court upheld the Corps' decision, rejecting Plaintiffs' NEPA challenges and finding that the agency's analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

First, the court addressed Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps' impacts analysis was deficient because it considered only temporary construction and dredging impacts and failed to analyze the long-term,

downstream effects of expanded operations, including increased vessel traffic. The court declined to consider this argument, finding that it was forfeited because Plaintiffs did not raise it during the administrative comment period. The court emphasized that NEPA requires parties to present their concerns during the agency's review process so that the agency has an opportunity to address them, and that raising new theories of impact for the first time in litigation is insufficient.

Second, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps' impacts analysis was deficient because it arbitrarily gave weight to project benefits without assessing corresponding costs. To the extent this argument flowed from Plaintiffs' claim regarding increased vessel traffic, the court found it forfeited for failure to raise it during the administrative process. To the extent the argument challenged the Corps' cost-benefit analysis independent of vessel traffic, the court rejected it on the merits.

The court looked to the Corps' NEPA implementing regulations, which provide that the scope of analysis for impacts and alternatives should be consistent with the scope used to evaluate a project's benefits. The court interpreted this requirement narrowly, explaining that the Corps is required to evaluate only those effects proximately caused by the permitted action, even if it discusses broader benefits of the overall project (Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 941 F.3d 1288, 1302 (11th Cir. 2019)).

Applying that framework, the court found that the Corps properly evaluated costs and benefits within the scope of its Clean Water Act public interest review. The Corps considered economic benefits, including increased energy availability and operational efficiencies, and weighed those benefits against environmental detriments, including impacts to wetlands, based on the administrative record and public comments. The court further explained that even if the Corps discussed broader project benefits, it was not required to evaluate costs at the same breadth under NEPA, because "[b]y using one document to serve many functions, the Corps can limit the scope of its review in one part and expand it in another, as each regulatory task requires." (*Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, 746 F.3d 698, 712 (6th Cir. 2014)). The court concluded that the Corps' assessment of costs and benefits was consistent with NEPA and was not arbitrary and capricious.

Third, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps failed to adequately assess the Terminal Project's incremental and cumulative impacts. Plaintiffs contended that the Corps' analysis was deficient because it did not fully evaluate the combined effects of the project alongside other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, including increased industrial activity and vessel traffic in the region.

The court disagreed, finding that the Corps conducted a sufficient cumulative impacts analysis under NEPA. The court explained that NEPA does not require agencies to engage in exhaustive or speculative analysis, but rather to consider cumulative effects to the extent they are reasonably foreseeable and supported by the record. Here, the Corps identified relevant categories of cumulative impacts, including impacts to wetlands, water quality, and surrounding environmental conditions, and evaluated those impacts in light of other activities in the project area. The court also rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps was required to quantify or analyze impacts at a more granular level, emphasizing that NEPA does not mandate a particular methodology so long as the agency's analysis is reasonable and adequately disclosed. The court found that the Corps reasonably relied on available data and its technical expertise in assessing cumulative impacts and provided a sufficient explanation for its conclusions.

Accordingly, the court held that the Corps' incremental and cumulative impacts analysis satisfied NEPA's "hard look" requirement and was not arbitrary and capricious.

Fourth, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps failed to assess cumulative impacts in accordance with the Clean Water Act (CWA). Plaintiffs contended that the Corps' public interest review did not adequately evaluate the combined effects of the project on aquatic resources, including wetlands, in conjunction with other regional activities.

The court found this argument unpersuasive, explaining that Plaintiffs failed to identify any meaningful difference between the cumulative impacts analysis required under the CWA and that required under NEPA in this context. Because the court had already determined that the Corps' cumulative impacts analysis satisfied NEPA's "hard look" requirement, it likewise concluded that the Corps did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in finding

that the project complied with the CWA's cumulative impacts requirements.

Fifth, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps failed to adequately analyze the project's climate change impacts. Plaintiffs contended that the Corps' analysis was deficient because it did not fully account for the project's contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and related climate effects, including those associated with increased vessel traffic and downstream operations.

The court found that the Corps' climate analysis satisfied NEPA's requirements. The court explained that NEPA does not require agencies to quantify greenhouse gas emissions or conduct a more detailed climate analysis where the agency has reasonably considered the issue and explained its conclusions. Here, the Corps acknowledged potential climate-related impacts, discussed emissions associated with the project, and explained the limits of its analysis based on available information and the scope of the permitted activity.

The court declined to require the Corps to analyze indirect or downstream emissions beyond those proximately caused by the permitted action, emphasizing that NEPA does not obligate agencies to assess effects that are speculative or outside the agency's control. The court further found that the Corps' qualitative discussion of climate impacts was sufficient, particularly where the record demonstrated that the agency considered the issue and provided a reasoned explanation.

Finally, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Corps was required to prepare an EIS rather than an EA. Plaintiffs contended that the significance of the project's impacts—including effects to wetlands, increased vessel traffic, and related environmental concerns—triggered the need for an EIS.

The court disagreed, finding that the Corps reasonably concluded that the project would not have significant environmental impacts and therefore appropriately issued a FONSI. The court emphasized that an agency's decision to prepare an EA rather than an EIS is entitled to deference so long as the agency has adequately considered the relevant factors and provided a convincing statement of reasons explaining why the project's impacts are not significant.

Here, the court found that the Corps evaluated the relevant intensity and context factors, considered potential impacts to wetlands, cultural resources, and other environmental concerns, and explained why those impacts would not rise to the level of significance. The court declined to require preparation of an EIS where the agency had identified, disclosed, and reasonably analyzed the potential impacts and supported its FONSI with a reasoned explanation.

Accordingly, the court held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in preparing an EA and issuing a FONSI rather than preparing an EIS.

Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 128 F.4th 1089 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. granted sub nom. ***Dep't of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan***, -- U.S.L.W. ---- (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026) (No. 25-579)

Agency Did Not Prevail.

Issue: Federal Action (Final Agency Action, Functional Equivalence Exemption)

Sector: Defense

Facts: Nonprofit organization (Prutehi) dedicated to protecting natural and cultural resources in Guam brought action against the Air Force, the Department of Defense (now, Department of War) and their respective Secretaries, alleging failure to comply with NEPA before submitting Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit renewal application to Guam Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for disposal of hazardous waste munitions on beach through open burning/open detonation operations (OB/OD).

The Air Force operates Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB) in northern Guam. It has erected an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) range at Tarague Beach, directly adjacent to the Base. The Air Force uses this range to dispose of "unserviceable ordnance and other pyrotechnic devices," such as "black powder, white/red phosphorus, tear gas, ammunitions, propellants, and [other] explosive materials."

The Air Force has used two methods to destroy hazardous munitions waste at Tarague Beach: OB/OD Open burning entails placing the waste munitions in a four-footwide, five-foot-tall "burn kettle," along with wood, roughly ten gallons of diesel fuel, and an

ignition device. Open detonation involves placing the waste munitions, an explosive charge, and an igniter into a pit. Under both operations, the igniter is remotely activated from a personnel bunker and the waste munitions are destroyed through burning or explosion. A 2,400 foot-radius safety zone surrounds the active treatment units at Tarague Beach.

The Air Force first received a RCRA permit to conduct OB/ OD operations on Tarague Beach in 1982. Every three years since then, it has applied for a new permit. Guam EPA has granted each permit since it was authorized to do so. While OD operations have occurred under each permit, no OB operations have taken place since at least the early 2000s.

Guam EPA issued the Air Force's most recent RCRA permit in 2018; it was set to expire on September 3, 2021. As the expiration date approached, the agency had to decide whether it would continue OD operations (and potentially restart OB operations) on Tarague Beach or find another way to manage hazardous waste munitions. The Air Force submitted an application for permit renewal in May 2021, reflecting its intention to conduct OB/OD operations at the beach from 2021 to 2024.

On October 15, 2021, Guam EPA issued to the Air Force its Notice of Preliminary Decision that "neither den[ie]d nor approve[d]" the Air Force's permit application while Guam EPA continued to review the public comments. In the meantime, with Guam EPA's approval, the Air Force has continued to operate the OB/OD facility on Tarague Beach under the terms of its 2018 permit while its renewal application is pending. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(d) (authorizing a renewal permit applicant to extend the life of its current permit by filing a timely and complete application to the appropriate RCRA permitting authority).

In 2021, Prutehi filed a complaint alleging that the agencies violated NEPA by submitting a RCRA permit renewal application without preparing an EIS or EA that "(1) takes the requisite 'hard look' at the environmental impacts of the proposed OB/OD operations, (2) considers a reasonable range of alternatives, including the 'no action' alternative, and (3) provides opportunities for public comment on the proposed operations and reasonable alternatives."

The lower court dismissed the complaint and determined that there was no final agency action, so

Prutehi's challenge was unripe, as Guam EPA had yet to decide on the permit application. As an alternate ground for dismissal, the district court held that Prutehi failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the Air Force's permit application was not subject to NEPA. The district court relied for this conclusion on the "functional equivalence doctrine," which exempts agency action from NEPA review where another statute imposes environmental review procedures that would be "redundant with" those provided for under NEPA. See *Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. U.S. E.P.A.*, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990).

Decision: Prutehi appealed the lower court's dismissal on both the determination that there was no final agency action, and further argued that the functional equivalence doctrine did not apply.

In a mixed decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the Air Force's decision to apply for a permit was a final agency action and the Air Force was required to comply with NEPA. The court reflected that the permit application "reflected the agency's commitment to a particular location for and method of waste munitions disposal," signifying "the endpoint in its decisionmaking process." This commitment "determined the agency's legal obligations." Thus, the permit application satisfied both prongs of *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).

In holding that NEPA applies, and the action is not functionally exempt based on the RCRA process. The Ninth Circuit in the past recognized "only 'two circumstances'" in which an agency need not comply with NEPA's procedural requirements "in the presence of major federal action and despite an absence of express statutory exemption": (1) "where doing so 'would create an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict' with the substantive statute at issue," and (2) where, "in limited circumstances, a substantive statute 'displaces' NEPA's procedural requirements." *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 959 F.3d 1154, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting *Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri*, 837 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016)).

Highlighting the differences between NEPA and RCRA (internal decision-making, alternatives, timing of the public reviews), the Ninth Circuit stated that the processes are fundamentally dissimilar in important respects. It distinguished *Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. U.S. E.P.A.*, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990),

stating that the defense agencies are not primarily concerned with environmental questions nor are they agencies whose "*raison d'être* is the protection of the environment."

In sum, the Ninth Circuit ruled that RCRA is not so similar to NEPA that it renders NEPA review redundant, nor is it so different from NEPA to suggest that Congress did not intend compliance with both statutes.

The Ninth Circuit remanded, reversing the lower court's grant of a motion to dismiss on behalf of the agency.

Dissent: Circuit Judge VanDyke dissented the majority's decision finding the permit application was a final agency action. Judge VanDyke emphasized that the agencies have undertaken their OB/OD operations at their Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) range since the early 1980s. As required by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Defendants first applied for a permit to conduct such operations more than four decades ago—in 1982. To continue implementing their ongoing OB/OD operations, Defendants like clockwork have applied to renew that same permit every three years, which the Guam EPA has always evaluated and then granted.

Judge VanDyke reasoned that even if the requirement to resubmit an application every three years presents the agency with an opportunity to decide to stop some longstanding activity, that still does not change the status quo from a longstanding and continuous activity to one of inactivity. Construing an intermediate decision point as changing the status quo would mean that any so-called period of inactivity—no matter how small—is a change to the status quo.

Judge VanDyke analogized a similar scenario: to show why this can't be correct, consider a forest ranger who puts gasoline into his truck so that he can continue his longstanding activity of patrolling the forest. That decision point does not change the status quo from patrolling the forest to not patrolling the forest simply because, had the ranger not refueled, he would have been unable to continue patrolling. Similarly, he discussed that the agencies' decision to submit the Permit Application did not change the status quo just because, had the agencies not

submitted, they would have had to cease their longstanding OB/OD operations.

In a lengthy dissent, he concluded that the application was not “the culmination of the agencies’ decisionmaking process, and it caused no change to the status quo,” but was merely “a routine part of implementing a pre-existing operational plan” that the agency had implemented “for decades.”

Okeelanta Corporation v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 132 F.4th 1320 (11th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Connected Action (Segmentation)

Sector: Utility

Facts: Okeelanta Corporation challenged the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ issuance of a Clean Water Act § 404 permit authorizing the construction and operation of a water storage reservoir and associated infrastructure in South Florida. The project was designed to support agricultural operations and regional water management objectives, including water supply, flood control, and water quality improvements. As part of the project, the Corps approved features that would store and treat water, including a Stormwater Treatment Area (STA), which would be used to improve water quality before discharge.

The Corps prepared an EIS evaluating the environmental effects of constructing and operating the reservoir and associated features, including impacts to wetlands, water quality, and surrounding ecosystems. The analysis focused on the direct effects of the permitted project and its reasonably foreseeable impacts.

Plaintiffs argued that the Corps’ NEPA analysis was deficient because it failed to adequately consider the indirect and cumulative impacts of related activities, including broader regional agricultural operations and potential future uses of the project infrastructure. In particular, Plaintiffs challenged the Corps’ decision not to fully analyze the potential standalone operation of the STA, which they argued could result in additional environmental impacts. The district court upheld the Corps’ decision, and Plaintiffs appealed.

Decision: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Corps’ approval, concluding that the agency complied with NEPA and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

First, the court held that the Corps reasonably defined the scope of its NEPA analysis by focusing on the effects of the permitted project rather than broader regional activities. The court emphasized that NEPA requires agencies to evaluate impacts that are proximately caused by the federal action, not speculative or attenuated effects that depend on independent decisions by third parties.

Second, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Corps failed to adequately consider indirect effects. The court explained that indirect effects must be both reasonably foreseeable and closely connected to the federal action. Here, the Corps reasonably determined that potential downstream impacts associated with future operations were too uncertain and dependent on future decisions to require detailed analysis at this stage. The court specifically addressed Plaintiffs’ argument concerning the standalone operation of the STA. It agreed with the Corps that any future decision to operate the STA as an independent or standalone facility would constitute a separate federal action. As such, that potential future operation was not required to be fully analyzed in the current EIS. Instead, the court explained that if and when the Corps approves standalone operation of the STA, that action would be the appropriate subject of a separate NEPA review, including, if necessary, a supplemental EIS.

Third, the court upheld the Corps’ cumulative impacts analysis, finding that the agency adequately considered the incremental effects of the project in combination with other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. The court declined to require a broader regional analysis where the agency had already evaluated cumulative impacts within a reasonable geographic and temporal scope.

Finally, the court concluded that the Corps satisfied NEPA’s hard look requirement. The court emphasized that NEPA is a procedural statute and does not mandate particular outcomes, and it deferred to the Corps’ technical expertise where the agency considered the relevant factors and explained its conclusions.

Center for a Sustainable Coast v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 24-14171 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Impact assessment

Sector: Construction

Facts: Lumar LLC sought to build a 500-square-foot private dock on the fancy Bluff Creek, adjacent to its 82-acre property on the Cumberland Island along the Georgia coast. The action was limited to dredging and associated construction activities necessary to improve vessel access to accommodate larger vessels. This project implicates primarily four federal statutes: the Rivers and Harbors Act, NEPA, the Cumberland Island National Seashore Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Because the Rivers and Harbors Act covers the coastal waters along Cumberland Islands shoreline, Lumar asked the Corps to issue a permit so that the dock project could get underway. The Corps can issue a “letter of permissions” for some Rivers and Harbors Act applications if “in the opinion of the district engineer, the proposed work would be minor, would not have significant individual or cumulative impacts on environmental values, and should encounter no appreciable opposition.” The Corps issued a letter of permission for Lumar’s dock, concluding that a categorical exclusion applied and that the proposed work would have negligible effects and also consulted with four agencies (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Park Service, and Georgia Department of Natural Resources) and none objected to the project.

Environmental groups, including the Center for a Sustainable Coast, challenged the Corps’ approval, arguing that the agency failed to adequately evaluate the environmental impacts of the project. Plaintiffs contended that the Corps improperly limited its analysis to the direct effects of dredging and construction and failed to consider the indirect and cumulative impacts associated with increased vessel traffic and expanded facility operations. The district court upheld the Corps’ decision, and Plaintiffs appealed.

Decision: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Corps’ decision, concluding that the agency reasonably relied on a categorical exclusion in issuing a letter of

permission and therefore was not required to prepare an EIS.

First, the court held that the Corps reasonably concluded that the dock project was “minor” based on its size, scale, and physical characteristics. The project involved construction of a relatively small private dock designed for recreational use, with minimal intrusion into navigable waters and consistency with other existing docks in the area.

Second, the court held that the Corps reasonably determined that the project would not have a significant impact on environmental values. The Corps evaluated the project across more than two dozen criteria, including soil and water conservation, water and air quality, noise, wildlife impacts, and shoreline effects, and found only negligible impacts. The Corps also required additional safeguards, including consultation with wildlife agencies and an archaeological assessment of potential impacts to historic and cultural resources.

Third, the court held that the Corps reasonably predicted that the project would not encounter appreciable opposition. Given the project’s limited scope and the lack of objection from relevant agencies, including the National Park Service, the Corps’ conclusion was entitled to deference even if opposition later materialized.

Fourth, the court upheld the Corps’ use of the categorical exclusion through the letter of permission process. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Corps could not apply the categorical exclusion to projects of this size, explaining that the governing regulation allows such streamlined review where the agency determines the project is minor, has no significant environmental impacts, and will not generate appreciable opposition. The court further rejected attempts to limit the categorical exclusion based on comparisons to other excluded activities, concluding that the Corps’ interpretation of its regulations was reasonable.

Finally, the court emphasized that NEPA review is highly deferential and requires only that the agency reasonably consider relevant factors and explain its decision. Because the Corps satisfied those requirements, its decision to rely on a categorical exclusion was not arbitrary or capricious.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 134 F.4th 568 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Impact Assessment (Indirect Impacts (Upstream/Downstream))

Sector: Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: Environmental organizations challenged the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) authorization of a large-scale project to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Alaska's North Slope to foreign countries without free trade agreements. The project required approvals from both the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which authorized the construction and operation of the export facilities, and DOE, which authorized the export of natural gas under the Natural Gas Act.

FERC prepared an extensive EIS, approximately 1,500 pages in length, analyzing the environmental impacts of constructing and operating the project, including impacts to wetlands, wildlife, water resources, and climate. DOE adopted FERC's EIS and initially approved the export authorization. After a change in administration and issuance of executive orders, DOE conducted additional review and prepared a supplemental EIS that further evaluated greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts associated with the project.

In its supplemental analysis, DOE considered the potential downstream environmental impacts of exporting LNG, including greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the combustion of exported gas in foreign countries. DOE concluded that, due to significant uncertainties in global energy markets and the extent to which LNG exports might displace other energy sources, it could not reliably determine the magnitude of those downstream impacts.

Plaintiffs challenged DOE's approval under NEPA, arguing that the agency failed to adequately analyze and quantify the environmental impacts of downstream emissions and improperly treated those impacts as too speculative.

Decision: The D.C. Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that DOE complied with NEPA and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

First, the court held that DOE reasonably determined that the environmental impacts of downstream emissions in foreign countries were too speculative to require detailed analysis under NEPA. The court explained that NEPA requires agencies to evaluate reasonably foreseeable environmental effects, but does not require analysis of impacts where the causal chain is uncertain or dependent on complex market forces. Here, DOE found that global energy market dynamics, substitution effects, and consumption patterns made it impossible to reliably predict whether LNG exports would increase or decrease overall greenhouse gas emissions. The court concluded that this determination was supported by substantial evidence and reflected a permissible exercise of agency expertise.

Second, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that DOE was required to quantify downstream emissions impacts. The court explained that NEPA does not mandate quantification in all circumstances, particularly where the underlying data and modeling are subject to significant uncertainty. Because DOE adequately explained why it could not draw definitive conclusions regarding the magnitude of climate impacts, its analysis satisfied NEPA's requirements.

Third, the court emphasized that relevant impacts must be reasonably foreseeable and sufficiently causally connected to the federal action. The court agreed with DOE that emissions resulting from the ultimate use of exported LNG in foreign countries depended on numerous independent variables, including foreign policy decisions, market demand, and substitution among energy sources, and therefore were not reasonably foreseeable in a manner that would require detailed NEPA analysis.

Finally, the court noted that DOE properly relied on and adopted FERC's EIS, which had already been upheld as compliant with NEPA in prior litigation, and declined to revisit those issues.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 25-12873, 2025 WL 2598567 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Major Federal Action

Sector: Construction

Facts: On January 6, 2023, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis declared a state of emergency, directing state law enforcement agencies and other state agencies to “take necessary actions” to protect Floridians from the impacts of mass illegal migration into the State. Within the first two months of 2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection had encountered over 460,000 persons attempting entry along the Southwest Border. Governor DeSantis declared that this heightening immigration crisis was overburdening local law enforcement and creating danger for Floridians.

On June 23, 2025, the Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) used its emergency powers to commandeer the Dade-Collier Training and Transition Airport to build a detention-and-deportation facility for illegal immigrants aka “Alligator Alcatraz.” Before FDEM assumed control of the airport, it was a small but bustling working airport which included flights from multi-engine planes, business jets, private helicopters, and military flights mainly during the day but at night upon request. The airport and site is owned by Miami-Dade County and is located within or directly adjacent to the Big Cypress National Preserve and the Big Cypress Area, a nationally and State protected, and ecologically sensitive area near the Everglades.

Construction of the Facility started immediately to include: kitchen facilities, restrooms, housing facilities, portable industrial lighting, and other infrastructure. There were various public statements that the Facility was requested by the federal government and that Florida would be fully reimbursed by the federal government for the costs, Florida had not filed an application for federal funds, nor formal federal funding funds approved.

On June 27, 2025, Friends of the Everglades and other plaintiffs filed suit and sought to halt the unlawful construction of the Facility claiming that DHS was required to prepare an EIS before construction. On August 21, 2025, the district court issued a preliminary injunction barring Florida and the U.S. from any additional construction at “Alligator Alcatraz” and ordered the site closed and dismantled within sixty days.

Decision: The Eleventh Circuit paused the district court’s preliminary injunction, allowing the project to proceed, and concluded that the federal and state defendants were likely to succeed on appeal for several reasons.

The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that its analysis was guided by recent Supreme Court precedent, explaining that it was “mindful that the Supreme Court intended *Seven County* to act as a ‘course correction’ to bring ‘judicial review under NEPA back in line with the statutory text and common sense.’” *Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Sec’y of DHS*, 2025 WL 2598567, at*4 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting *Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County*, 605 U.S. 168, 145 S. Ct. 1497(2025)). The court further noted the potential for abuse when NEPA is treated as more than a procedural statute, observing that “NEPA has transformed from a modest procedural requirement into a blunt and haphazard tool employed by project opponents [...] to try to stop or at least slow down new infrastructure and construction projects.” *Id.* at *4.

First, the court concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their NEPA claim because the construction and operation of the facility did not qualify as a “major Federal action” under NEPA as amended in 2023. The court emphasized that the statute excludes a non-federal action with no or minimal federal funding or with no or minimal federal involvement where a federal agency cannot control the outcome of the project, and it faulted the district court for effectively reading that disjunctive “or” as an “and.” In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, the absence of any approved or disbursed federal funding was enough to take the project outside NEPA’s major-federal-action requirement at this stage. The court stressed that although public officials said Florida would be reimbursed, Florida had not submitted a funding application and DHS/FEMA had not approved

any federal award, so there was no legally operative federal funding decision yet.

Second, the court held that plaintiffs were also unlikely to prevail because the alleged failure to prepare an EIS was not, by itself, a reviewable final agency action under the APA. Relying in part on *Seven County*, the court explained that an EIS is only an input into agency decisionmaking, not the agency action itself. So before plaintiffs could challenge the lack of an EIS, they first had to identify a reviewable major federal action that triggered NEPA in the first place. Because the court concluded there was no such major federal action on this record, it held that the APA claim was likely foreclosed as a matter of law. This aspect of the decision is useful for NEPA practitioners because it shows the court treating the “major federal action” and “final agency action” inquiries as threshold gates, not merely downstream merits questions.

Third, the court held that the defendants had shown irreparable harm if the injunction remained in place. The court reasoned that the injunction interfered with Florida’s asserted emergency response and immigration-enforcement efforts and would limit DHS’s ability to detain and remove noncitizens. The court also emphasized that the injunction would require the State to spend an estimated \$15 to \$20 million to dismantle the facility, only to incur those costs again if the injunction were later lifted.

The court also questioned the district court’s decision to order dismantling of the facility through a mandatory preliminary injunction. It explained that, even if NEPA ultimately applied, the more typical interim remedy would have been to halt further construction or use of the facility pending compliance, rather than require the immediate expenditure of public funds to take the site apart.

Finally, the court held that the balance of harms and the public interest weighed in favor of the defendants. The court acknowledged plaintiffs’ evidence of environmental harms, including impacts related to light, noise, runoff, habitat, and waste, but concluded those harms were less immediate than the harms identified by the federal and state defendants relating to immigration enforcement and public safety.

The court also noted that the site had long operated as an active airport, which informed its assessment of

existing environmental conditions. For NEPA practitioners, this part of the opinion is notable because the court was willing, at the preliminary-injunction stage, to directly weigh asserted environmental harms against operational and public-interest concerns, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court guidance (*Seven County*) warning against using NEPA as a substantive barrier to agency action.

Dissent: Circuit Judge Jordan provided a lengthy dissent, arguing that the majority failed to properly apply the deferential standards governing review of a preliminary injunction. In his view, the district court reasonably concluded that there was sufficient federal involvement to trigger NEPA and did not abuse its discretion in granting preliminary relief.

Judge Jordan pointed to several indicators of federal involvement supporting the conclusion that the project constituted a major federal action. These included public statements that the facility was requested by the federal government, the expectation that the project would be reimbursed with federal funds, and the coordination between Florida and federal agencies in carrying out the project. In his view, these facts were sufficient, at a minimum, to support the district court’s finding that NEPA likely applied.

He further emphasized that the district court reasonably treated the failure to prepare an EIS as a reviewable action and permissibly found that environmental and tribal harms justified preliminary relief. Judge Jordan stressed that appellate courts must defer to a district court’s factual findings and balancing of harms unless there is a clear error or abuse of discretion.

He criticized the majority for departing from that standard and substituting its own judgment for that of the district court. As he explained, “[t]he majority, however, essentially ignores the burden borne by the defendants, pays only lip service to the abuse of discretion standard, engages in its own factfinding, declines to consider the district court’s determination on irreparable harm, and performs its own balancing of the equities.”

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Montana Wildlife Federation v. Haaland, 127 F.4th 1 (9th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed on some NEPA claims, but not on other NEPA claims.

Issues: EA and Determination of NEPA Adequacy (DNA); Public Involvement, Remedy.

Sector: Energy (Oil and Natural Gas))

Facts: Environmental organizations challenged Bureau of Land Management (BLM) policies governing oil and gas lease sales on public lands containing protected sage-grouse habitat. The dispute involved both procedural and substantive issues: whether BLM provided adequate opportunities for public participation for its EA during environmental review, and whether BLM complied with land use plan requirements to prioritize leasing outside sensitive habitat.

In 2015, BLM amended its resource management plans to promote sage-grouse conservation by requiring prioritization of oil and gas development outside designated habitat. To implement this objective, BLM issued Instruction Memoranda (IMs) governing leasing procedures and public participation.

In 2018, BLM revised these policies. One memorandum limited the habitat prioritization requirement to situations where the agency faced a backlog in processing lease nominations. Another significantly shortened or eliminated public comment and protest periods associated with lease sales and NEPA review.

Environmental groups filed suit in Idaho and Montana, alleging that lease sales conducted under the 2018 policies violated NEPA, FLPMA, and the APA. The district courts granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs, concluding that certain lease sales violated public participation requirements and land use plan consistency, and vacated the challenged policies and lease sales. Federal defendants and intervenors appealed.

Decision: The Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the district courts, holding that BLM violated NEPA, but reached different conclusions as to the appropriate remedy.

First, the court held that BLM violated NEPA's public participation requirements. The court found that BLM eliminated in some instances, and severely shortened in others, opportunities for public comment during NEPA review. In particular, BLM reduced comment periods to as little as 15 days, a significant departure from prior practice. The court concluded that this truncated timeframe was insufficient to allow meaningful public participation, as it limited the ability of stakeholders to review environmental information, conduct site visits, consult experts, and prepare informed comments. While NEPA does not mandate a specific comment period, the court emphasized that agencies must provide a meaningful opportunity for public involvement consistent with NEPA's twin aims of informed decisionmaking and informed public participation. BLM's failure to explain why such shortened timelines were adequate rendered its actions arbitrary and capricious.

The court further held that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) independently requires public participation in decisions regarding the management of public lands. The court explained that decisions to offer parcels for oil and gas leasing fall squarely within FLPMA's mandate, and therefore BLM had a duty to involve the public to some extent in those decisions. By curtailing protest and comment opportunities without adequate justification, BLM violated both NEPA and FLPMA.

Finally, the court addressed remedy, applying the *Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n*, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) test to determine whether vacatur of the lease sales was appropriate. The case involved two separate district court decisions, one from Montana and one from Idaho, arising from different lease sales but consolidated on appeal.

As to the Montana lease sales, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the leases. The court concluded that the agency's errors were serious, particularly because they undermined core statutory requirements related to public participation and land use plan consistency, and that those errors could have affected the outcome of the leasing decisions. In balancing the

seriousness of the errors against the disruptive consequences to leaseholders and government agencies, the court determined that vacatur was appropriate.

As to the Idaho lease sales, however, the court reached the opposite conclusion. Applying the same *Allied-Signal* framework, the court held that the disruptive consequences of vacating the leases outweighed the seriousness of the agency's procedural errors. The court emphasized that the violations in Idaho were more limited in scope and could be remedied without undoing the lease sales. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in vacating those leases.

Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 141 F.4th 976 (9th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed on all NEPA claims but one.

Issue: Purpose and Need, Alternatives, Impact Assessment (GHG)

Sector: Energy (Oil and Natural Gas)

Facts: The case involved the Willow Project which is an oil and gas venture in American's northern Arctic. BLM approved the Project in 2020, allowing ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. to construct infrastructure to produce and transport oil and gas from its leases in Alaska's National Petroleum Reserve. Several environmental groups sued. The district court vacated the approval, holding that BLM violated NEPA by declining to consider reasonable project alternatives in its EIS based on the assumption that ConocoPhillips had the right to "extract all possible oil and gas from its leases. The district court also concluded that the 2020 EIS violated NEPA because it did not analyze the effects of Willow's downstream foreign greenhouse gas emissions. The district court vacated the approval, remanded, and instructed BLM to "reassess its alternatives analysis."

BLM then prepared a Supplemental EIS (SEIS) to address the deficiencies identified by the district court. The SEIS evaluated two types of alternatives: alternative components and action alternatives. In developing these alternatives, BLM maintained that any viable action alternative must allow for "full development" of the oil field, which shaped the range of alternatives considered. Although BLM analyzed several action alternatives in the SEIS, the Record of

Decision ultimately selected a version of the Project that differed in material respects from the specific alternatives analyzed, including reductions in the number of drill sites and associated infrastructure.

Plaintiffs again challenged BLM's approval, arguing that the revised alternatives analysis remained unlawfully constrained and that the agency failed to adequately analyze the environmental impacts of the selected alternative. The district court upheld BLM's post-remand approval. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered whether BLM's SEIS and Record of Decision complied with NEPA's requirements, particularly with respect to the agency's alternatives analysis and its treatment of reasonably foreseeable impacts.

Decision: The Ninth Circuit largely upheld BLM's analysis and approval of the Willow Project, rejecting most of Plaintiffs' claims, but identified a limited deficiency in the agency's alternatives analysis.

First, the court held that BLM complied with NEPA in its analysis of downstream greenhouse gas emissions. By estimating emissions from reasonably foreseeable future development within the cumulative effects section of the SEIS, BLM adequately considered both indirect and cumulative impacts. The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that BLM was required to perform a more granular or separate analysis, explaining that NEPA requires disclosure of impacts, not precision or a particular methodology. Because BLM quantified emissions and disclosed its assumptions and limitations, its analysis satisfied NEPA's "hard look" requirement.

Second, the court held that BLM did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in selecting mitigation measures under the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act. The court explained that the statute grants BLM discretion to balance resource development with environmental protections, and that the agency reasonably considered and incorporated mitigation measures designed to minimize impacts to wildlife, subsistence uses, and surface resources. The court declined to second-guess the agency's policy judgments where the record demonstrated that BLM had considered relevant factors and explained its choices.

Third, the court upheld BLM's use of a "full field development" standard to guide its alternatives analysis, finding that the agency had a rational basis

for structuring its review around full development of the leases. However, the court found that BLM failed to adequately explain why the final approved alternative deviated from that standard, requiring further explanation on remand.

A concurring judge agreed with the majority's resolution but emphasized the practical constraints facing agencies in large, complex projects, particularly where lease rights and economic considerations shape the range of reasonable alternatives. The concurrence highlighted the importance of allowing agencies flexibility in refining project alternatives during the NEPA process.

A separate opinion concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the majority was too deferential to BLM on certain aspects of its analysis. The opinion suggested that BLM's constraints on the alternatives analysis were overly narrow and that the agency should have more fully evaluated less intensive development scenarios. The dissenting portion reflects an ongoing tension in NEPA cases over how much discretion agencies have in defining project objectives and narrowing alternatives.

American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby, 144 F.4th 1178 (10th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed on its NEPA claims.

Issues: Predecisional, Alternatives, Impact Assessment

Sector: Land Management

Facts: Wild Horse Advocates challenged the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) amendments to its regional management plan (RMP) to reduce wild horse population goal in certain herd management areas after private landowner revoked consent for BLM to manage wild horses on its land that was part of checkerboard pattern of public and private land ownership, alleging NEPA violations.

To ensure the BLM amendments to its RMP addressed management issues on the checkerboard, BLM published first a draft EIS and then a Final EIS. The Final EIS and Record of Decision (ROD) explained why BLM believed Alternative D best addresses the Purpose and Need for the RMP Amendment, is technically capable of implementation, and accomplishes a balance of multiple-use

values by maintaining a wild horse herd in a portion of the planning area. In its rationale, BLM explained that it could not maintain horse herds in the solid blocks of public land within Great Divide Basin or Salt Creek Wells without constant straying onto private checkerboard land.

Petitioners challenged BLM's decision under NEPA, making three claims: (1) BLM predetermined its decision; (2) BLM failed to properly consider land swaps; and (3) BLM did not consider the environmental impacts of increased grazing.

Decision: The Tenth Circuit affirmed BLM's amendments involving the NEPA challenges, concluding that the agency complied with NEPA.

First, Petitioners claimed that BLM predetermined its outcome. They argued that because the RMP Amendments stem from the Grazing Association's revocation and follow the 2012 consent decree, BLM's only goal was to meet the Grazing Association's demands. This argument does not "meet [the] high standard to prove predetermination." *Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 611 F.3d 692, 714 (10th Cir. 2010). The court disagreed with the Petitioners' argument and held that the Petitioners could not show that BLM committed to any outcome before the NEPA process or that the process was somehow deficient.

Second, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that BLM failed to adequately consider alternatives. Petitioners challenged the EIS's alternatives analysis. They claimed that BLM did not fully consider land swaps—trading checkerboard land to consolidate federal land for wild horse management. BLM explained that it "does not currently have a proposal from a willing party (or group of parties) to a land exchange involving checkerboard lands in the planning area," and even if it did, "a land exchange would entail extensive surveys of millions of acres for mineral value, cultural resources, and potential hazardous materials, which would likely take years to complete and demand extensive agency resources." Citing to *Seven Cnty.*, 145 S.Ct. at 1513–14, the court found that BLM's explanation of why land swaps are infeasible to be reasonable.

Finally, Petitioners claimed BLM ignored the environmental impacts of the potential of increased grazing. Citing to *Seven County*, 145 S.Ct. at 1515, the

Court ruled that “when the effects of an agency action arise from a separate project—for example, a possible future project or one that is geographically distinct from the project at hand—NEPA does not require the agency to evaluate the effects of that separate project.” The court held that just because the effects were foreseeable, did not mean BLM can be held responsible for these effects.

The Tenth Circuit held that BLM complied with NEPA and took the requisite good faith “hard look.”

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 153 F.4th 748 (9th Cir. 2025)

Court only discussed NEPA claims in the dissent (finding that BLM’s EIS should have been found sufficient)

Issue: Deference

Sector: Land Management

Facts: This case arises from a long-running dispute over a proposed land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and J.R. Simplot Company involving federal land near Pocatello, Idaho. The land, located adjacent to Simplot’s phosphate-processing fertilizer plant, is valuable to the company as a site for storing phosphogypsum, a byproduct of fertilizer production, which would allow the plant to continue operating for decades. The land at issue, however, was originally part of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ reservation and was ceded to the United States under an 1898 agreement ratified by the Act of 1900, which governs how those lands may be disposed of. Beginning in the 1990s, Simplot proposed a land exchange under which it would convey other parcels to the federal government in return for the federal tract. After years of administrative review, BLM approved the exchange pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes then sued the Department of the Interior and BLM, arguing that the Act of 1900 restricts disposal of the ceded lands and does not authorize an exchange of this kind. The district court upheld the land exchange, concluding that BLM had authority under FLPMA. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Act of 1900 controls the disposition of the ceded lands and limits BLM’s authority to complete the exchange.

Decision: The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the land exchange was not authorized under the governing statutory framework. The court focused on the interaction between the Act of 1900 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), concluding that the more specific provisions of the 1900 Act controlled the disposition of the ceded lands. In particular, the court determined that the 1900 Act limits how those lands may be transferred and does not authorize the type of land exchange approved by BLM. As a result, the court rejected BLM’s reliance on its broader authority under FLPMA and held that the agency exceeded its statutory authority in approving the exchange.

In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized traditional principles of statutory interpretation, including that specific statutory directives govern over more general grants of authority and that agencies must act within the limits Congress has established for particular categories of land. The court declined to defer to BLM’s interpretation where it conflicted with the plain structure and purpose of the earlier statute governing the Tribes’ ceded lands. Although the majority did not address NEPA, the decision is notable for NEPA practitioners because it reinforces that agency actions must first be grounded in proper statutory authority before NEPA compliance is even reached. In this way, the case serves as a reminder that challenges to federal land management decisions may turn on threshold statutory constraints rather than environmental review alone.

Dissent: Judge Bumatay wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the majority failed to afford appropriate deference to the agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority and improperly substituted its own judgment for that of BLM.

The dissent addressed NEPA principles more directly, emphasizing that judicial review of agency decisionmaking must remain highly deferential. Citing recent Supreme Court guidance, Judge Bumatay underscored that “deference is our marching order.” He explained that NEPA requires only a procedural “hard look” and does not permit courts to second-guess the substance of agency decisions. In his view, BLM’s environmental analysis fell within a permissible “zone of reasonableness,” and the majority’s approach risked turning NEPA into a vehicle for

judicial micromanagement and delay of agency action.

Cascadia Wildlands v. U.S Bureau of Land Mgm't, 153 F.4th 869 (9th Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Tiering, Impacts (Marbled Murrelets, Scientific Integrity of the data and analysis.

Sector: Land Management

Facts: This case involves a number of administrative actions centering around timber harvesting and wildlife protection in coastal Oregon forests. Plaintiffs challenged BLM's approval of the Big Weekly Elk Forest Management Project (BWE Project), a land management action authorizing certain forms of logging in federally owned Oregon coastal forests.

The BWE Project was implemented pursuant to a broader Resource Management Plan (RMP) and associated EIS, which govern land use allocations and manage direction across BLM lands in the region. These programmatic documents establish categories of land use, including areas prioritized for timber production (the "Harvest Land Base") and areas reserved for conservation objectives (such as "Late Succession Reserves"), and include management direction for protected species, including the marbled murrelet. BLM prepared an EA for the site-specific project and issued a FONSI, relying in part on the prior programmatic EIS.

The BWE Project proposes forest management activities on BLM-administered lands in Coos County, Oregon, within 28 miles of the Pacific Coast – land that is already subject to the RMP's land use designations and management direction. The site-specific BWE Project authorizes thinning of forest in the "Late-Successional Reserve" and heavier regeneration harvesting in the "Harvest Land Base", as well as "transportation management actions," such as road construction.

Because the project operates within this layered planning framework, BLM's NEPA analysis incorporated and tied to prior programmatic decisions, while providing additional project-level analysis of environmental effects.

According to the Plaintiffs, the BWE Project runs afoul of the provisions in the governing land use framework designed to protect the marbled murrelet, a seabird species that depends on mature and old-growth forest habitat. Plaintiffs alleged that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of the project, particularly its effects on marbled murrelet habitat. Plaintiffs argued that the agency failed to adequately analyze site-specific impacts, improperly relied on tiering to broader documents, and did not sufficiently evaluate potential edge effects and other habitat-related impacts.

Decision: The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BLM, holding that the agency did not violate the RMP and satisfied NEPA's "hard look" requirement.

First, the court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the BWE Project violated the governing RMP. Plaintiffs contended that the project was inconsistent with the RMP's management direction for marbled murrelet habitat, particularly within Late-Successional Reserves. The court found that the RMP allows for active forest management, including thinning in reserve areas, so long as such activities are consistent with long-term habitat objectives. The court deferred to BLM's interpretation of its own plan, emphasizing that although the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has expertise in species conservation, the interpretation of a multiple-use land management plan falls within BLM's authority.

As the court explained, "[w]hile FWS may indeed be the expert on murrelet conservation and what is necessary for murrelet recovery, this case involves the interpretation of a land use plan that seeks to balance many different uses, including murrelet conservation. This case does not fall outside the ambit of BLM's expertise simply because the portion of the RMP at issue involves an endangered species that is also regulated by FWS."

The court further found that the relevant murrelet management direction in the RMP was ambiguous, but that BLM's interpretation - limiting the scope of restrictions on modifying nesting habitat - was reasonable. The court explained that ambiguity alone does not resolve the issue; rather, courts must determine whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable and entitled to deference. Here, the court concluded that BLM's interpretation warranted

controlling weight, as it reflected a reasonable reading of the RMP and fell within BLM's expertise in administering its own land use plan.

Second, the court held that BLM took the requisite "hard look" at environmental impacts under NEPA. The court found that the agency adequately analyzed the project's effects on marbled murrelet habitat, including potential edge effects and habitat modification. Although Plaintiffs argued that the analysis was insufficiently detailed and relied too heavily on prior programmatic documents, the court concluded that NEPA permits tiering and that BLM appropriately supplemented the broader EIS with project-specific analysis in the EA.

The court emphasized that NEPA does not require agencies to eliminate uncertainty or conduct the most exhaustive analysis possible, but rather to provide a reasoned evaluation of environmental consequences. Here, BLM acknowledged potential impacts, relied on available scientific evidence, and explained its conclusions. The court declined to second-guess the agency's technical determinations.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that BLM's approval of the BWE Project was neither inconsistent with the RMP nor arbitrary and capricious under NEPA.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 125 F.4th 1170 (D. C. Cir. 2025)

Agency did not prevail.

Issues: Cumulative Impacts, Connected Actions/Segmentation, Impact Assessment (Environmental Justice)

Sector: Transportation (Rail); Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: Environmental organizations (Sierra Club), various state attorney generals, and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians petitioned for review of Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) rule authorizing the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by rail in approved rail tank cars, asserting that the agency should have conducted an EIS, and alleged certain NEPA deficiencies in the EA.

Decision: Petitioners argued that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious because it ignored the significant environmental consequences of the LNG Rule. They claimed that PHMSA failed to take a hard look at how the LNG Rule would affect public safety and therefore violated NEPA. In support of their argument, Petitioners noted that PHMSA disregarded the checkered safety record of the 120W tank car and ignored the risks of including numerous cars of LNG within a single train without any required speed limit.

The D.C. Circuit agreed, and highlighted several concerns with the rule, including the lack of limits on the number of LNG tank cars in a single train and the absence of a speed limit for such trains. The PHMSA noted that one company was considering LNG trains with up to 80 cars, raising fears of potentially catastrophic outcomes. During the rulemaking process, environmental groups emphasized that the energy content in 22 LNG tank cars could be equivalent to the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II.

The Third Circuit denied the Petition.

Marin Audubon Society v. Federal Aviation Admin.
129 F.4th 869 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Parties in Joint Motion prevailed.

Issues: Remedies

Sector: Transportation (Aviation)

Facts: Environmental organizations (collectively, Marin Audubon) initially petitioned for review of FAA and NPS' approval of air travel management plan governing commercial tourist flights over four national parks without environmental analysis other than a categorical exclusion under NEPA. In *Marin Audubon Society v. FAA*, 121 F.4th 902 (D.C. Cir. 2024), the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded. Parties filed joint motion for stay of the portion of the opinion holding that the air tour management program must be "set aside."

Decision: The parties requested a stay only of the portion of the opinion holding that the air tour management program must be "set aside." *Marin Audubon*, 121 F.4th at 918–19. They pointed out that without a stay of the mandate, the prior interim

system would be revived on remand while the Agencies comply with our decision. Under that system, “nearly twice as many flights were authorized for two park units and even more for the other two park units,” frustrating Petitioners' goals to reduce overflights.

Vacating the plan could “thus harm the very places (the park units) and people (petitioners)” that Congress “meant to protect.” *Id.* The original panel granted a stay of the judgment in the case (having previously denied the petitioners request for remand without vacatur). The court explained that in cases like this, in which the party challenging a government regulation for being too lax as opposed to too stringent, a stay may be justified so as not to leave the petitioner in worse condition than before filing suit. In such cases, the D.C. Circuit explained, equitable considerations may justify a stay without compromising the effect of the court's conclusion that the agency action was unlawful.

Judge Srinivasan concurred separately for substantially the same reasons—i.e., that vacatur without any stay of the mandate would have the effect of putting the prevailing parties in a worse position vis-à-vis the protections at issue than if they had not brought their challenge.

Badger Helicopters v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 154 F. 4th 902 (8th Cir. 2026)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Alternatives, Impact Assessment

Sector: Transportation (Aviation)

Facts: Commercial air tour operators petitioned for review of FAA order, raising NEPA challenges to air tour management plans (ATMP) that FAA and National Park Service (NPS) issued pursuant to Air Tour Management Act that banned all commercial air tours over Mount Rushmore National Memorial and Badlands National Park.

In 2023, federal agencies issued ATMPs for Mount Rushmore National Memorial and Badlands National Park, banning all commercial air tours over the Parks and the area within a half mile of the Parks' boundaries, except for limited authorized purposes. The agencies' final decisions in the EA explained that air tours negatively affected visitor experience,

wildlife, and tribal cultural experiences. The agencies thus believed banning air tours best fit the goals of the Parks.

The D.C. Circuit denied the Petitions.

Decision: Petitioners argued the agencies violated NEPA by failing to use reliable data, failing to consider a reasonable range of alternatives, and failing to consider aviation safety. The court found that the agencies complied with NEPA's procedural requirements, used reasonable data, considered an adequate range of alternatives, and sufficiently addressed aviation safety concerns.

In the first challenge, Petitioners did not challenge the agencies' modeling, but rather the underlying inputs (data from certain years) used for the modeling, specifically the flight operation data and the non-air tour noise from the years 2019 and 2003. Upon review, the D.C. Circuit held agencies' choice of flight data was reasonable because it relied on reliable data, which was in the agencies' view, “the most accurate and current data available during the period that th[ese Plans were] being drafted.” *See U.S. Air Tour Ass'n v. FAA*, 298 F.3d 997, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2002). As to the 2003 data uses, the court criticized the Petitioners for not contesting the accuracy of the past reports but arguing only that the data is older than they would prefer. The court provided the agencies substantial deference in their NEPA analysis and would not “not micromanage” choices “about the depth and breadth of [their] inquiry.”

Petitioners challenged the agencies' determinations that the ATMPs impacted bighorn sheep and peregrine falcons in the Parks. The court disagreed, stating that the agencies did assess impacts to bighorn sheep and that 70% of the sheep in the Parks were lost in 2021 due to disease. The agencies noted both species (big horn sheep and peregrine falcons) are susceptible to noise disturbance and that stressors such as air tour noise could impact their populations.

The court rejected petitioners' contention that the agencies failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives in their EA. The D.C. Circuit discussed and reviewed the agencies' consideration of four alternatives. While the agencies did not include alternatives that would have adjusted the flight routes or altitudes from the current flight operations, they considered doing so and concluded otherwise.

Lastly, the D.C. Circuit did not agree with Petitioners' contention that the agencies failed to consider aviation safety relying on 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(b) (2)(iii) (2020), which required agencies to consider adverse effects on "public health and safety," since they would be implemented against the backdrop of the FAA's "rules governing the operation of aircraft within the United States." See 14 C.F.R. § 91.1.

The court concluded that the agencies' decisions were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions to vacate the air tour management plans

Sector **INDEPENDENT AGENCIES**

Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 125 F.4th 229 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Purpose and Need, alternatives analysis, impacts assessment

Sector: Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: FERC approved the application for a natural gas pipeline to service two new natural gas turbines pursuant to State of Indiana plan to retire a coal-fired facility. FERC declined to act on a petition for rehearing, thereby denying challenges to the pipeline approval.

Decision: The D.C. Circuit denied all claims related to FERC's NEPA analysis in its EIS. First, it held that NEPA did not require FERC to consider non-gas alternatives that are outside of the agency's jurisdiction and would fail to serve the Project's purpose. In this case, a private party (CenterPoint) proposed to "utilize flexible natural gas combustion turbines to support [its] new intermittent renewable resources." Petitioners asked the agency to consider non-gas alternatives and to redefine the project purpose as promoting solar and wind power. The court rejected that theory, holding that FERC could not lawfully define the project purpose so broadly. Its role was to review a pipeline application. FERC properly rejected petitioner's expanded range of alternatives because they would not satisfy the purpose of transporting natural gas to CenterPoint.

Second, and relatedly, the court rejected petitioner's argument that non-gas alternatives be considered as part of the baseline no-action alternative. FERC properly restricted the no-action alternative to the baseline of the Indiana Commission's energy plan and assumptions of what impacts would result if the proposed pipeline were not built.

Third, with respect to the impacts assessment, the court rejected arguments concerning the adequacy of FERC's greenhouse gas emission analysis and use of various social cost of carbon measures. The court upheld FERC's analysis consistent with several other rulings confirming the agency's discretion on using (or not using) the social cost of carbon measure. Finally, the court held that FERC was not required to label potential emissions as "significant" or "non-significant." The court found that FERC has thoroughly analyzed project emissions in the EIS and therefore did not have to place a label on the nature of those impacts.

American Whitewater v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 125 F.4th 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Alternatives

Sector: Energy (Hydroelectric)

Facts: FERC prepared an EA considering the impacts of a proposed surrender of a hydroelectric project license on the Salmon Fall River between New Hampshire and Maine. Petitioners challenged adequacy of the EA, arguing that two dams from the Project should be removed as a condition of the requested surrender. The project proponent argued that the dams in question were critical for local community water supply and that a local water treatment plant would be adversely affected if the dams were removed. No party challenged whether a full EIS should have been prepared.

Decision: The court held that FERC reasonably concluded that removal of the dams was infeasible for a variety of practical and environmental reasons and did not need to be considered as part of the reasonable range of alternatives. Despite arguments from petitioners that several beneficial impacts from dam removal could result, the court concluded that FERC reasonably credited information from various

sources concerning the potential infeasibility of dam removal. Moreover, the court found that FERC was not required to the precise quantification of every potential environmental impact. Here, the court held that FERC properly considered statements from local governments concerning the important functions of the dams in question. Finally, FERC's final Surrender Order and Rehearing Order adequately discussed the benefits and drawbacks of dam removal in detail.

City of Port Isabel v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 130 F.4th 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed in part on the vacatur decision and did not prevail in part (on the reconsideration of the merits).

Issue: Remedy/vacatur; intervening regulatory developments

Sector: Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: The D.C. Circuit previously found substantial procedural NEPA errors in FERC's analysis of agency's reauthorization of two liquified natural gas facilities and an association pipeline and ordered supplemental review. Project proponents filed a motion for rehearing disputing portions of the panel merits analysis and arguing that any errors in FERC's orders did not warrant vacatur.

Decision: The court partially granted the petition, remanding the orders to FERC without vacatur. The court weighed the traditional *Allied-Signal* factors, the seriousness of the deficiencies identified and the disruptive consequences of vacatur. As to the first factor, the panel concluded that unlike a previous ruling ordering vacatur following FERC's failure to prepare any NEPA document, the errors identified in this matter were not so "fundamental" because of the extensive record of NEPA analyses for the underlying projects. The court also revisited the potential practical consequences of vacatur, and when considered in the context of the nature of FERC's procedural errors, concluded that those errors did not justify throwing the projects and the planning supporting those projects into disarray.

Finally, the court declined to revisit its earlier ruling after intervening executive orders were issued reversing some of the underlying policies requiring, for example, consideration of environmental justice impacts. The court acknowledged that the new

administration policies would clearly impact FERC's consideration on remand but left it to the agency to address those issues in the first instance.

Healthy Gulf v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 132 F.4th 544 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency Prevailed.

Issue: Impact assessment

Sector: Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: FERC prepared an EIS to review the proposal to build and operate two natural gas pipelines in southwestern Louisiana. The EIS found that the project would result in certain adverse impacts, including the potential increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases, but declined to characterize those effects as significant or insignificant. Petitioners challenged the analysis of the agency's analysis of upstream greenhouse gas emissions, the failure to characterize greenhouse gas emissions impacts, and the agency's failure to consider the project's effects in tandem with the impacts of building an LNG terminal at the end of the proposed pipelines.

Decision: In a ruling issued prior to *Seven County*, the D.C. Circuit. The court upheld those conclusions.

Petitioners alleged that FERC should have made more detailed inquiry into the potential source and location of upstream wells. In a potential preview of *Seven County*, the court held that the project developer "will not drill the gas wells, nor control where others will drill them." The record did not reflect that the pipeline developer had a reasonable ability to predict the sources of natural gas over time.

As in other recent D.C. Circuit rulings, the court rejected claims that FERC should have characterized the total amount of potential greenhouse gas emissions as significant or insignificant. As in other cases, FERC reasonably explained why it did not use the social cost of carbon protocol. Moreover, FERC complied with the then in force CEQ regulations concerning explanations for not applying models to monetize emissions values for NEPA evaluation purposes.

Finally, the court rejected claims that FERC should have considered the impacts of an LNG terminal as a

connected action because petitioners failed to raise those arguments in comments on the draftEIS.

Appalachian Voices v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 139 F.4th 903 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed

Issues: Impact assessment, duty to supplement

Facts: FERC issued a finding of good cause to extend a construction deadline for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, a project that has undergone numerous litigation challenges over many years. Among other challenges, petitioners challenged the agency’s failure to consider additional mitigation measures in the EIS for erosion and runoff because of the pipeline project.

Decision: The court held that petitioners failed to present new and substantial evidence that different and additional mitigation measures for the project were insufficient to protect soil or aquatic resources in the EIS. With respect to allegedly new information presented to FERC in the context of the extension request, the court found that the evidence did not justify renewed environmental analysis. Finally, the court held that the project sponsor had not made any substantial changes to the project necessitating supplemental NEPA review. The court viewed the claim as a request to relitigate concerns previously raised when FERC approved the underlying project.

The most interesting part of this decision lies in the strongly worded concurrence by Circuit Judge Henderson. She said: “America was once a nation that built. * * * But one driving factor of our national sclerosis has been lawsuits such as this one.” She complained of a “cottage industry” of legal challenges resulting in a “tidal wave of litigation.” She complained that plaintiffs don’t have to win these lawsuits, they just need to delay the projects long enough to force abandonment of the proposed action. She wrote that the court system had “enabled interest groups to transform the bench into a tool to stymie any new development. It is long past time to correct our mistake.”

Arguably, Judge Henderson takes the *Seven County* “course correction” even further than Justice Kavanaugh. She explores the underlying principle of deference but also encourages a more in-depth review of standing requirements and of a court’s

authority to issue injunctive relief. She concludes: “NEPA was a modest statute meant to inform an agency during its decision-making process. Our deference to the agency should therefore be two-fold: deferential because we are exercising limited “arbitrary and capricious” review of agency action, and deferential because the underlying statute is purely procedural.”

Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 145 F.4th 74 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issue: Purpose and Need; indirect effects/connected actions,

Sector: Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: Environmental advocacy organization and private citizen petitioned for review of FERC’s approval of 1,000-foot natural gas pipeline crossing border with Mexico and declination of jurisdiction over longer upstream connector pipeline running for another 157 miles into rural Texas.

Decision: Court first ruled that FERC did not improperly define the project Purpose and Need in the EIS so narrowly, that there was only one feasible alternative. In this case, FERC was asked to review the needs of the applicant to link one pipeline to another across the Texas-Mexico border. The agency reasonably gave substantial weight to the preferences of the applicant/sponsor in the siting and design of the proposed project. Quoting *Seven County*, the court said that in weighing claims concerning feasible alternatives, a court “must be at [its] most deferential.”

Next, the court rejected claims that FERC should have considered a broad scope of indirect upstream effects of the proposed pipeline, as running “headlong” into the Supreme Court’s “course correction” in *Seven County*. The court held that FERC reasonably drew a line at declining to review impacts of a connected pipeline and stated that *Seven County* “shut the courthouse door to NEPA nitpicking in the name of causally attenuated indirect effects.”

Finally, the court refused to order FERC to consider the impacts of a potentially related state facility as part of its NEPA review. Because FERC was not the

authorizing agency for that state facility, that action was not “federalized” for purposes of NEPA review.

Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 153 F.4th 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: Alternatives (No-Action), Impacts (GHG), Connected Actions

Sector: Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) decided to replace a coal-fired unit with a natural gas turbine. Challenge involved FERC’s approval of a 32-mile pipeline that would service the new turbine.

Decision: The court cited to *Seven County*’s principle of deference as an introductory statement prior to its ruling. After a fulsome review of the Supreme Court’s principles of APA judicial review of NEPA actions, the court rejected petitioner’s claims.

First, the court held that the agency’s analysis of downstream greenhouse gas emissions was adequate in its EIS. It upheld FERC’s assumption of potential greenhouse gas emissions reductions as a credit in its analysis, resulting from the retirement of an existing coal-fired facility. Based on TVA’s representations, the agency properly considered the reduction of emissions related to the planned retirement of the coal-fired plant in addition to potential emissions from the new natural gas turbine.

The court also upheld FERC’s approach for the length of time it calculated potential emissions from the existing coal-fired facility. Although it stated that FERC could have taken a different analytical approach (meaning reviewing a shorter period), the court would not second guess the agency’s choice. And the court summarily rejected petitioner’s argument that the emissions estimates should have been aggregated instead of calculated annually.

Second, the court upheld FERC’s definition of the no-action alternative. In short, the court concluded that FERC reasonably presumed that TVA’s natural gas turbine would be built regardless of whether the pipeline in question was ever approved. The court briefly reviewed the potential tension between the no-action (baseline) analysis and the assessment of indirect effects but concluded that the *Seven County*

standard indicated it should be at its most deferential when reviewing the exercise of the agency’s expertise in framing its impacts assessment.

Finally, the court rejected Sierra Club’s allegations that FERC failed to consider impacts of the natural gas turbine as a “connected action” because FERC lacked jurisdiction over the development of the turbine. Using the *Seven County* conclusion, it was reasonable for FERC to decline to review the impacts of the related development.

In a noteworthy coda to its ruling, the court recounted a portion of the case’s oral argument. One of the judges asked the Sierra Club if it believed any of the 60 environmental impact statements prepared by FERC over the past decade were adequate. The attorney could not identify one. The court found that reality inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions in *Seven County*. It concluded: “...the era of searching NEPA review is over – or at least it should be.”

Gas Transmission Northwest, L.L.C. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 157 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

Agency Did Not Prevail in Part

Issues: No-action alternative; connected actions; impact assessment

Sector: Energy (Natural Gas)

Facts: Natural gas pipeline company, states of Washington and Oregon, and environmental organization petitioned for review of FERC orders, approving expansion of pipeline that involved Gas Transmission NW, LLC’s replacement of, and eventual increase in capacity relating to, three compressor units for its natural gas pipeline system to transport natural gas from Western Canada to Washington, Oregon, and California.

Decision: First, the court upheld the agency’s admittedly brief analysis of the no-action alternative in its EIS. FERC provided a resource-by-resource analysis of the existing state of each resource (i.e., the baseline) and how the project would impact that *status quo*. The court found that under *Seven County*, that was sufficient. Citing to *Seven County*, the court held, “[a]lthough it did not provide much detail, a difference may exist between what an agency should do as a matter of good policy and best practices under

NEPA, and what a reviewing court may subsequently order an agency to do under NEPA.”

pedestrian/train strikes caused by potentially higher train traffic.

Second, the court found that FERC drew a reasonable line when it declines to assess the impacts of replacement compressors as potential “connected actions.” The court held that it was reasonable for FERC to conclude that the replacements were not two phases of a single action, but “separate, independent projects.” That was a reasonable, “manageable line” for FERC to draw.

Third, the court rejected claims that FERC did not adequately consider safety risks of the proposed expansion project. The agency discussed incremental safety risks and mitigation resulting from the Department of Transportation’s safety standards, as well as the proposed compressor station’s remote location. Under *Seven County*, this was sufficient.

Coalition to Stop CPKC v. Surface Transp. Board, No. 23-1165, 2025 WL 1720672 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2025)

Agency prevailed.

Issues: CEQ Authority to Issue Implementing Regulations, Impact Assessment (Baseline)

Sector: Transportation (Rail)

Facts: The STB prepared an EIS reviewing the proposed merger of Canadian Pacific and Kansas City Southern railroads. The EIS reviewed a wide range of effects, including those related to altered rail operations resulting from the merger, such as passenger-train delays, road crossing delays, and pedestrian safety

Decision: In a per curiam ruling, the D.C. Circuit cited to *Seven County* holding that the STB was entitled to substantial deference in evaluating the EIS and that the court will “not micromanage th[e] agency[’s] choices so long as they fall within a broad zone of reasonableness.”

The court summarily rejected five disputes regarding the assumptions underlying the STB’s analysis. These assumptions related to train speeds, average train length (by overweighting passenger trains compared to freight trains), freight train length, the flow of train and vehicular traffic, and the lack of pertinent field studies. Finally, the court held that the STB reasonably considered the risk of increased